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Within the fraught field of investor-state dispute settlement, no cases are more
controversial than those in which an investor seeks damages for the cancellation
of a project following an outcry by local communities over potential
environmental or social impacts. Tribunals have almost always ruled for the
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investor’s “reasonable” or “legitimate” expectations. This Article argues that
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beyond investor expectations that may be relevant to liability or quantum in such
cases, including local remedies and emerging standards of conduct with which
investors should be expected to comply. Finally, the Article shows that the
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proposed interpretive framework is consistent with the texts of investment treaties
and their underlying rationales and could address a number of concerns that
threaten these treaties’ long-term viability.
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INTRODUCTION
Investment treaties and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
have generated tremendous controversy in recent years. Both are
regularly denounced as dire threats to national sovereignty and the
ability of governments to protect their citizens and the environment
from the excesses of multinational enterprises. 1 No cases have drawn

1. Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth About
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 694–95, 700 (2014) (describing the rising chorus of criticism
against investment treaties and ISDS, including arguments that tribunal awards violate
“the sovereignty of the state as well as its legal institutions” and that investment treaties
have a “chilling effect on the future development of regulations for public health,
safety and the environment,” and further “the interests of multinational corporations
at the expense of poor states”).
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more scorn than those in which foreign investors have challenged
regulatory measures adopted by host states in the public interest. 2
Within that genre of dispute, a specific strain has emerged that is
perhaps most controversial of all: cases in which the investor seeks
damages from the host state for having canceled a development
project following an outcry by local communities who feared that the
project would contaminate their water supplies, destroy their sacred
sites, threaten endangered plants or wildlife, or wreak other serious
harm. 3 I will refer to these cases herein as “Community Conflict Cases.”
The investor invariably contends that state authorities initially
authorized or encouraged its project, inducing the investor to commit
its capital, before suddenly reversing course in response to community
pressure. 4 When arbitral tribunals have reached the merits of these
claims, they have almost always ruled in the investor’s favor—usually
on the reasoning that the host state’s reversal frustrated the investor’s
2. Vera Korzun, The Right to Regulate in Investor-State Arbitration: Slicing and Dicing
Regulatory Carve-Outs, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 355, 382 (2017) (“ISDS allows foreign
corporations to interfere with the host government’s ability to regulate, constraining
the state’s capacity to function for the benefit of the public.”); Stephan W. Schill, Deference in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
577, 578, 591 (2012) (describing criticisms that “arbitral tribunals use the vague standards of
investment protection to intrude into the regulatory space of host states”).
3. Detailed summaries of several such cases are provided infra Section II.B. Cases
fitting this pattern include Abengoa, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/09/2, Award (Apr. 18, 2013); Aven v. Republic of Costa Rica, Case No.
UNCT/15/3, Award (Sept. 18, 2018); Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru,
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award (Nov. 30, 2017); Clayton v. Canada, Case No. 200904, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2015); Commerce Group
Corp. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Award (Mar. 14, 2011);
Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 2012-2, Award (Perm.
Ct. of Arb. 2016); Cosigo Res., Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia, UNCITRAL, Notice of
Arbitration and Statement of Claim (Feb. 19, 2016); Gabriel Res. Ltd. (Jersey) v. Rom.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/15/31, Notice of Arbitration (July 21, 2015); Glamis Gold, Ltd.
v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award (June 8, 2009); Infinito Gold Ltd. v. Republic of
Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5, Request for Arbitration (Feb. 6, 2014); Lone
Pine Res. Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, Notice of Arbitration
(Sept. 6, 2013); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000); Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID
Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 1, 2012); S. Am. Silver Ltd.
(Berm.) v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Award (Nov. 22, 2018);
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003); TransCanada Corp. v. United States, ICSID
Case No. ARB/16/21, Request for Arbitration (June 24, 2016); Windstream Energy
LLC v. Canada, Case No. 2013-22, Award (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2016).
4. See case summaries, infra Section I.B.
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“reasonable” or “legitimate” expectations. 5 These decisions have
contributed to the legitimacy crisis facing investment treaties and ISDS
and the resulting calls to radically transform them or even scrap them
altogether. 6 This Article will contend, however, that a few adjustments
to the analytical framework employed by tribunals under existing ISDS
mechanisms when interpreting existing treaties can strike a more
effective balance between investor rights, human rights, and
environmental protection—all while remaining faithful to treaties’
texts and purposes.
The proposed adjustments target the notion of reasonable or
legitimate expectations, which tribunals routinely view as central to
their analyses when adjudicating some of the most popular treaty
claims: expropriation, fair and equitable treatment (FET), and
minimum standard of treatment (MST). 7 This Article will argue that
tribunals cannot properly evaluate investor expectations without giving
due attention to several factors that are frequently overlooked or
glossed over. It also identifies issues beyond investor expectations that
may be relevant to liability or quantum, but that are likewise often
neglected—including conduct that should reasonably be expected
from investors. Specifically, this Article recommends that tribunals
incorporate the following five guidelines into their analyses in
Community Conflict Cases.
First, tribunals should identify and give effect to aspects of domestic
law that may limit investor expectations. In some cases, tribunals have
either ignored potentially relevant domestic law or given it scant
attention. Notably, in the case of large-scale projects like those typically
at issue in Community Conflict Cases, any approvals sought by an
investor will often be contingent upon an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) and stakeholder consultations, with decision-makers
5. See infra Section I.B.
6. See, e.g., Christopher M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term
Legitimacy and Stability of International Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 725, 738–40
(2008) (discussing Metalclad and Tecmed and noting that these and similar cases have
been cited by critics as evidence that tribunals’ interpretations of investment treaties
“make it difficult for governments to govern”); Schill, supra note 2, at 578–79
(describing the legitimacy crisis and actions that some states have already begun to
take in response, including withdrawal from or redrafting of treaties, replacing ISDS
with dispute settlement in domestic courts, the creation of a standing investment
court, or state-to-state arbitration in lieu of ISDS).
7. The nature of these claims, and the relevance of “reasonable expectations”
thereto, is discussed infra Section I.A.
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having discretion to deny the proposal if the results of these processes
are not favorable. 8 In addition, domestic law may give decision-makers
the power to revoke authorizations if actual impacts exceed those
anticipated or if the investor violates applicable regulations. 9 The risk
of such a denial or revocation should necessarily inform, and limit, the
investor’s expectations. Nevertheless, tribunals in some Community
Conflict Cases have faulted host states for denying proposals based on
concerns that arose in EIAs and stakeholder consultations 10 or have
dismissed as irrelevant aspects of domestic law that might have justified
revoking a permit. 11
Second, tribunals should generally accord significant deference to
host state authorities when they interpret and apply their own law, as
when determining whether or not conditions for any approval were
satisfied or grounds existed to revoke an approval. 12 In some
Community Conflict Cases, tribunals have purported to show such
deference, but were in fact quick to reject determinations by state
authorities that were adverse to the investor, even as they accepted
without scrutiny prior statements or findings that were favorable. 13
When faced with conflicting findings on the same subject matter, a rule
of thumb that would serve tribunals well is to show greater deference
to state authorities when they take action that has the potential to
protect against threats to the public or the environment, as compared
to when authorities could be concealing or downplaying such threats. 14
Third, tribunals should consider whether local remedies were
reasonably available to the investor that could have corrected any
asserted error in the application of domestic law that operated to the
investor’s detriment. If such remedies were available and the investor
failed to pursue them, the claim may be defective on the merits. 15
Fourth, the tribunal should confirm that the investor’s purported
expectations were compatible with international law, including the
host state’s binding obligations under human rights instruments and
international environmental law. 16 Tribunals in Community Conflicts
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Section II.A.1.
See infra Section II.A.2.
See infra Section II.A.1.
See infra Section II.A.2.
See infra Section II.B.1.
See infra Section II.B.2.
See infra Section II.B.2.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.D.
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Cases usually have declined to examine in any depth the host state’s
non-investment obligations. 17 Yet if the state violated its international
obligations when making commitments to the investor, and the
investor knew or should have known of this violation, then the investor
arguably cannot reasonably expect to enforce those commitments. 18
While it is relatively rare that commitments to an investor will violate
the host state’s international obligations, there have been Community
Conflict Cases in which the investor claimed a reasonable expectation
to engage in activity that may well have implicated such a violation. 19
Fifth, tribunals should recognize that investors engaged in highimpact activities must be mindful of a risk of community conflict, and
expect that, to avoid such conflict, they may need to take any number
of steps whether or not required by law. 20 Such steps may include
reasonable measures to mitigate project impacts, engage with affected
communities, and share benefits with them. 21 Any investor who
neglects to employ these measures may have only itself to blame for
any resulting social conflict or at least be partly at fault—a factor that
could warrant a reduction in damages. 22
If applied consistently going forward, the foregoing guidelines have
the potential to alleviate some of the concerns that are driving public
opinion against investment treaties and ISDS, while still ensuring
investors protection against conduct that can properly be characterized
as arbitrary, discriminatory, bad faith, or expropriatory.23 While this
framework would not eliminate altogether the need for further reform in
international investment law, it could serve as a useful bridge before treaties
are re-drafted or other more elaborate measures are adopted. There is a
pressing need for such a ready-made solution because investor-community
conflicts arise with regularity and several pending ISDS proceedings have
arisen from such conflicts24—disputes that present a prime opportunity to
apply the proposed framework.
17. See infra Section II.D.
18. See infra Section II.D.1.
19. See infra Section II.D.1.
20. See infra Section II.E.
21. See infra Section II.E.
22. See infra Section II.E.
23. See infra Section III.A (providing examples of how state conduct could violate
investment treaties notwithstanding application of the proposed guidelines).
24. Examples include Cosigo Res., Ltd. v. Republic of Colom., UNCITRAL, Notice
of Arbitration and Statement of Claim (Feb. 19, 2016); Gabriel Res. Ltd. (Jersey) v.
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/31, Notice of Arbitration (July 21, 2015); Infinito
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The discussion will proceed as follows. Part I will explain the
potential relevance of investor expectations and how this concept has
been applied in a sample of Community Conflict Cases to date. Part II
will develop in detail the guidelines described above and show how
they could have made a difference in particular cases. Part III will
identify circumstances in which respondent states could be found
liable, despite the application of the proposed guidelines, and seek to
demonstrate that the outcomes contemplated by the proposal would
be fully consistent with the rationales underlying investment treaties.
I. THE NOTION OF “REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS” AND ITS
APPLICATION IN COMMUNITY CONFLICT CASES
The significance that tribunals routinely assign to investor
expectations is sometimes cited as evidence of a pro-investor bias
within ISDS: an inherent tendency to uphold investor prerogatives at
the expense of state regulatory responsibilities and the public interest.25 As
the discussion below will reveal, however, tribunals have valid reasons for
seeking to ascertain what the investor reasonably expected when it made its
investment. When tribunals reach questionable results, it is not because
they made this basic inquiry, but because they may not have considered
everything that should have informed the investor’s expectations or
focused on investor expectations to the exclusion of other relevant factors.
Section I.A will explain the relevance of investor expectations to some of
the most common claims asserted in ISDS: expropriation, FET and MST.
Section I.B will then summarize a set of Community Conflict Cases decided
on the merits to date, highlighting how the tribunals applied the notion as
well as other issues that tribunals ignored or quickly dismissed, but which
might have warranted different outcomes.
Gold v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5, Request for Arbitration
(Feb. 6, 2014); Lone Pine Res. Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2,
Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 6, 2013).
25. See, e.g., Francesco Costamagna, SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST BEYOND THE
SINGLE MARKET: EXTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW DIMENSIONS 98 (Markus Krajewski
ed., 2015) (describing the analyses in various treaty awards as biased because “[t]he
focus of these decisions was firmly on investors’ position and on their expectations,
while paying little consideration to the position of the host State and its right to
regulate”); Mojtaba Dani & Afshin Akhtar-Khavari, Rethinking the Use of Deference in
Investment Arbitration: New Solutions Against the Perception of Bias, 22 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 38, 39–40 (2018) (“The perception of bias is particularly significant
when, during the deliberations of investment tribunals, investors’ profits and interests
seem to outweigh the regulatory autonomy of states.”).
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A. The Relevance of Investor Expectations
Many investment treaties explicitly refer to investor expectations as
a factor to be considered when evaluating expropriation claims. For
example, the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement (FTA), at issue in
the Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru 26 case discussed below,
provides: “The determination of whether a measure or series of
measures of a Party constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a
case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers . . . the extent to which the
measure or series of measures interferes with distinct, reasonable investmentbacked expectations[.]” 27 The treaty also identifies two other factors as
relevant to the analysis: the character of the measure and the
measure’s economic impact. 28
These three factors were derived from U.S. takings jurisprudence,
and ISDS tribunals often employ them even when the relevant treaty
does not expressly refer to them. 29 The rationale behind the
reasonable investment-backed expectations criterion is that if someone
made an investment in reliance on an established regulatory
framework or on governmental assurances, then it may not be fair for
the state to change the rules after the fact to the investor’s detriment. 30
The second criterion—the character of the measure—examines
whether the state was seeking to advance an important public purpose

26. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Award (Nov. 30, 2017).
27. Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Peru, art. 812.1, May 29, 2008
[hereinafter Canada-Peru FTA] (emphasis added), https://international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/peru-perou/ftaale/background-contexte.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/9AWM-U4H5].
28. Id.
29. Hao Zhu, Dynamically Interpreting Property in International Regulatory Takings Regimes,
51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 129, 152–53 (2017) (summarizing the development of these
factors in U.S. takings jurisprudence and their use by ISDS tribunals).
30. See Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“The purpose of consideration of plaintiffs’ investment-backed expectations is to limit
recoveries to property owners who can demonstrate that ‘they bought their property
in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime.’”
(quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994));
Lockaway Storage v. Cty. of Alameda, 216 Cal. App. 4th 161, 168, 185–86 (2013)
(holding that landowner’s expectation of being able to operate a boat and RV selfstorage facility on its property was reasonable because county officials assured the
landowner that it could do so before it acquired the land; subsequently-enacted land
use restrictions effected a taking).
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in restricting the investor’s activities, such as preventing a nuisance. 31
The final criterion—economic impact—aims to limit takings claims to
property owners who experienced a serious financial loss. 32
ISDS tribunals frequently also examine the investor’s expectations
when adjudicating FET or MST claims. To understand why, one must
consider the nature of these standards.
Most investment treaties include a provision in which the host state
commits to provide FET to covered investors or their investments. 33 In
some treaties, the provision refers to FET in isolation, while in others
it refers to FET “in accordance with international law,” or equates FET
with the “minimum standard of treatment” or MST. 34 The MST refers
to a basic floor for states’ treatment of aliens under customary
international law, below which states may not go without incurring
international responsibility. 35
When the treaty does not expressly link FET with international law,
FET is often viewed as an autonomous concept. Under this reading,
the host state will violate the treaty if it fails to treat the investor fairly
and equitably, whether or not that treatment violates the MST. 36
Tribunals employing this interpretation have identified a number of ways
the host state can violate the FET standard, including failing to act with
due process, discriminating against the investor, operating in a nontransparent manner, or frustrating the investor’s “reasonable” or

31. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491–92
(1987) (“[A]ll property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the
owner’s use of it shall not be injurious to the community.”); Walcek v. United States,
49 Fed. Cl. 248, 270 (2001), aff’d, 393 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that this
criterion “requires the court to consider the purpose and importance of the public
interest underlying the regulatory imposition” and “inquire into the degree of harm
created by the claimant’s prohibited activity”).
32. Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1340.
33. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 130 (2d ed. 2012) (“Most bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and other investment
treaties provide for fair and equitable treatment (FET) of foreign investments.”).
34. Id. at 135 (describing variations in the wording of FET provisions).
35. ROLAND KLÄGER, ‘FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT’ IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 48–49 (2011) (describing the MST and its historical development).
36. PATRICK DUMBERRY, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT: ITS INTERACTION WITH THE
MINIMUM STANDARD AND ITS CUSTOMARY STATUS 32–33 (2018) (observing that most
tribunals have interpreted standalone FET clauses as establishing an autonomous
standard delinked from customary international law, which provides a higher level of
protection than the MST).
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“legitimate” expectations.37 For example, in Tecnicas Medioambientales
Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States 38—a Community Conflict Case
summarized below—the tribunal asserted that FET precludes the host
state from undermining “the basic expectations that were taken into
account by the foreign investor to make the investment.” 39
While the content of the MST is unsettled, it is often viewed more
restrictively than FET as a stand-alone standard. 40 Several tribunals
have asserted that the host state will violate the MST only if its conduct
is “egregious and shocking,” as where it commits “a gross denial of
justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of
due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons.” 41
Others have characterized the MST as having evolved in recent
decades, such that host state conduct no longer needed be outrageous
or shocking to violate it; merely being unfair or unreasonable could
suffice. 42 There is wide agreement, however, that one way the host state
could violate the MST would be to frustrate an investor’s reasonable or
legitimate expectations. 43 Some tribunals have considered a wide
range of state conduct as potentially giving rise to such expectations, 44
while others have restricted the inquiry to specific commitments or
assurances that the host state may have offered to induce the

37. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 33, at 145–60 (summarizing scenarios that
have been deemed contrary to the FET obligation in arbitral jurisprudence).
38. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003).
39. Id. ¶ 154.
40. DUMBERRY, supra note 36, at 32–33.
41. See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 616 (June 8, 2009).
42. See, e.g., Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID
Administered Case, Award, ¶¶ 207–08, 210, 213 (Mar. 31, 2010).
43. See, e.g., Clayton v. Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and
Liability, ¶ 455 (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2015) (“The reasonable expectations of the investor
are a factor to be taken into account in assessing whether the host state breached the
[MST].”); Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award, ¶¶ 621–22 (asserting that a host state could violate
the MST if its conduct “creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of
an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said conduct”).
44. See, e.g., Clayton, Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability at ¶ 455
(asserting that to ascertain the claimants’ reasonable expectations, the tribunal would
need to review the claimants’ interactions with officials of the host state, the legal and
policy framework that existed at the time, and “general and specific encouragements”
provided by host state authorities).
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investment. 45 Under any of these approaches, however, at least some
state conduct can give rise to reasonable expectations.
It must be acknowledged that some states have disputed that the
MST encompasses a notion of reasonable expectations, asserting an
absence of state practice and opinio juris in support of this concept. 46
Nevertheless, even these states have acknowledged that if a host state
makes specific assurances to an investor and later abrogates them, the
state’s conduct could violate the MST—and have at times couched this
concept in terms of reasonable expectations. 47
This Article therefore assumes the potential relevance of investor
expectations to expropriation, FET, and MST claims. It proceeds to
consider how the concept has been applied in Community Conflict Cases,
and how tribunals could enhance their application of the concept—as
well as other aspects of their analytical framework—going forward.
B. Representative Community Conflict Cases
The following is a summary of five Community Conflict Cases,
presented in chronological order. Two can be thought of as
companion cases of a sort because they both involve hazardous waste
facilities in Mexico: Tecmed and Abengoa. 48 The other cases involve a
proposed gold mine in the United States (Glamis), 49 a proposed quarry

45. See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award ¶¶ 621–22, 627 (limiting the inquiry to specific
assurances or other conduct by the host state intended to induce the investment).
46. See, e.g., Submission of the United States of America, Windstream Energy LLC
v. Canada, Case No. 2013-22, Award, ¶ 16 (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2016); Gov’t of Canada,
Reply to 1128 Submissions, Mesa Power v. Canada (June 26, 2015), ¶ 12,
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw6300_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C8PA-HS5Y].
47. See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award at ¶ 576 (noting acknowledgement by United
States that an MST breach could occur “when express assurances or contractual
commitments made to induce foreign investment had been breached”); Gov’t of
Canada, Counter-Memorial, Windstream Energy LLC v. Canada, (Jan. 20, 2015) ¶ 410,
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4288_0.PDF
[https://perma.cc/7PBV-3PWT] (“Before the expectations of a foreign investor may
even be considered as relevant to the question of whether or not a State has [breached
the MST], a claimant must first prove that its expectations . . . were based on a specific
assurance or promise by the State made to induce the investment . . . .”).
48. Abengoa, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/09/2, Award (Apr. 18, 2013); Tecnicas MedioambientalesTecmed, S.A. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 35 (May 29, 2003).
49. Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award ¶ 10.
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and marine terminal in Canada (Clayton), 50 and a proposed silver mine
in Peru (Bear Creek). 51 While these arbitrations are by no means the
total corpus of Community Conflict Cases, they are particularly
relevant because the tribunals reached the merits of the treaty claims
and applied a notion of reasonable or legitimate expectations.
1.

Tecmed v. United Mexican States
The claimant in this case, Tecmed, was a Spanish company that
acquired a hazardous waste landfill in Mexico near the municipality of
Hermosillo. 52 Despite the dangerous nature of the materials to be
transported through the city on the way to the landfill where it would
be stored, there is no indication in the award that Tecmed engaged
with the community or sought to ascertain public attitudes toward the
project before making the acquisition. According to Tecmed, it relied
on the fact that the government issued the necessary permits for the
facility and the facility had already been operating for some time. 53 It
is notable, however, that once taking over the landfill, Tecmed’s local
subsidiary, Cytrar, began accepting new types of waste and adopted
new practices—including trucking hazardous waste through the city in
open bags—which generated instant controversy. 54
Under pressure from community members, federal authorities
inspected Cytrar’s operations, found violations of a number of
environmental regulations, and imposed fines. 55 Cytrar purported to
address the violations, but later inspections found further violations,
and authorities imposed new fines. 56 Before long, community
opposition to the landfill became “widespread and aggressive.” 57 A
local NGO filed a complaint against Cytrar for environmental crimes, 58
and protestors marched to the landfill and began a blockade that
lasted for months. 59

50. Clayton v. Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 37
(Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2015).
51. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Award, ¶ 1 (Nov. 30, 2017).
52. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, ARB(AF)/00/2 ¶ 36.
53. Id. ¶¶ 35–38.
54. Id. ¶¶ 49, 105, 107.
55. Id. ¶ 107.
56. Id.
57. Id. ¶ 108.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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When Cytrar’s operating permit was up for review, a federal agency
found that Cytrar had committed numerous additional legal violations
beyond those already sanctioned 60 and declined to renew the permit. 61
Federal authorities considered allowing Cytrar to build a new facility
in a different location, but ultimately rejected that possibility. 62
In response to these events, Tecmed launched an arbitration against
Mexico under the 1995 Spain-Mexico Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT). 63 The tribunal ruled in Tecmed’s favor, finding that the
withdrawal of Cytrar’s permit constituted an expropriation and a
denial of FET. The tribunal rested its holding on the notion that, by
issuing the necessary permits, federal authorities had given Tecmed
the legitimate expectation that Cytrar would be able to operate the
landfill indefinitely. 64 The tribunal asserted that Cytrar’s violations of
environmental regulations did not justify closing the landfill and that
the real motivation for the closure had been “community pressure.” 65
The tribunal deemed it significant that when federal authorities had
previously found Cytrar in violation of environmental regulations, they
had merely imposed fines. 66 The tribunal also placed emphasis on
prior statements by federal authorities asserting that the landfill did
not pose a serious threat. 67
2.

Glamis Gold v. United States
Glamis, a Canadian company, sought to develop a gold mine on
federal land in southeastern California. 68 Glamis invested several
million dollars to acquire the mining rights, carry out exploratory
work, and pursue environmental permits. 69 Glamis would later
contend that it was induced to make these investments because the
applicable regulatory framework gave it a reasonable expectation that

60. Id. ¶ 99 (listing violations); id. ¶ 123 (“During its operation of the Landfill,
Cytrar breached a number of the conditions under which the Permit was issued . . .”).
61. Id. ¶¶ 39, 97–99.
62. Id. ¶ 112.
63. Id. ¶ 4; see also Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Spain-Mex., June 23, 1995 [hereinafter 1995 Spain-Mexico BIT].
64. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, ARB(AF)/00/2 ¶¶ 149, 154.
65. Id. ¶¶ 123–28, 141, 163.
66. Id. ¶¶ 124, 137.
67. Id. ¶ 124.
68. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 10 (June 8, 2009).
69. Id. ¶ 98.
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it would be able to exploit its mining rights. 70 As in Tecmed, however,
the claimant’s narrative overlooked risks associated with the project,
including a trend toward increasing regulation in the mining sector 71
and opposition from a local Native American tribe. 72
The project was located within the California Desert Conservation
Area (CDCA), which Congress had designated for protection because
it was environmentally sensitive and featured important cultural and
archaeological resources. 73 The federal Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) authorized Glamis to undertake exploratory work at the site,
and Glamis determined that there was enough gold to make the
project profitable. 74 Glamis drafted a plan of operations, which called
for excavating three large open pits and constructing associated
processing facilities, where Glamis would separate the gold from waste
rock through a cyanide heap-leach process. 75 When finished, Glamis
would only partially backfill the open pits. 76
Federal regulations allowed for mining in the CDCA, but only if it
could be conducted without “unnecessary or undue degradation”
(UUD). 77 Moreover, any operations would have to comply with state
and federal laws, including those on air and water quality, wildlife and
plant habitat, and cultural resources. 78 In addition, federal legislation
required BLM to conduct an EIA prior to approving the proposal 79 and
to consider potential effects on items of cultural or religious
significance to Native American tribes. 80 Finally, because the project
fell within the ancestral lands of the Quechan Tribe, BLM was required
to consult the Tribe and take its views into account. 81
The ensuing impact assessment revealed that the land surrounding
the project featured extensive cultural resources, including ancient
pictographs, tool deposits, and trails—all of which were sacred to the

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. ¶ 633.
Id. ¶ 639.
Id. ¶ 676.
Id. ¶¶ 31, 44.
Id. ¶¶ 86–87, 115–17.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 54–55.
Id. ¶ 59.
Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶¶ 76–78.
Id. ¶¶ 77–78, 103–05.
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Quechan. 82 The trails were part of a larger network known as the Trail
of Dreams, which played a vital role in Quechan history and
cosmology. 83 BLM determined during the impact assessment process
that the mine would destroy fifty-five Native American traditional
historic properties that were eligible for listing in the National Register
of Historic Places. 84 In addition, there would be significant,
unavoidable impact on the ability of the Quechan to travel along the
Trail of Dreams and conduct traditional religious activities. 85 BLM
determined further that because Glamis did not intend to completely
backfill the open pits, the project would result in “unavoidable adverse
impacts to visual quality in this substantially undisturbed landscape.” 86
In light of these anticipated impacts, the Quechan Tribe expressed
strong opposition to the mine during consultations. 87 There is no
indication in the award that Glamis engaged with the Tribe before
making its investments or that the company offered it any economic
benefits to help compensate for the mine’s adverse effects.
Based on the results of the impact assessment and input from the
Quechan and the general public, BLM determined that Glamis’
proposal would cause UUD and rejected Glamis’ proposal. 88 Glamis
brought a lawsuit challenging that decision, contending that BLM had
misapplied the UUD standard. 89 While the case was pending, a new
Secretary of the Interior—appointed by President George W. Bush—
directed BLM to reconsider its decision. 90 Yet, before BLM could do
so, the State of California took action in response to the Quechan
Tribe’s concerns about the project that effectively precluded approval
of Glamis’s proposal. 91 Specifically, the state enacted legislation
prohibiting the approval of any hardrock surface mining operation in
California located near a Native American sacred site, unless the pits
would be backfilled and graded to the approximate original contours
82. Id. ¶¶ 89–108.
83. Id. ¶¶ 105–08.
84. Id. ¶ 99; DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., CA 670-41027, RECORD OF
DECISION FOR THE IMPERIAL PROJECT (2001), https://www.blm.gov/ca/pdfs/elcentro
_pdfs/Glamis_ROD_final_1-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WU7-LC2G].
85. Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award ¶ 110.
86. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 84, at 3.
87. Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award ¶¶ 102–08, 127.
88. Id. ¶¶ 148–55.
89. Id. ¶¶ 156, 633–37.
90. Id. ¶¶ 157–59.
91. Id. ¶¶ 167, 171–77.
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of the land. 92 Glamis contended that the new requirements would
make the project financially infeasible and abandoned the venture. 93
Glamis initiated arbitration under the investment chapter of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 94 alleging that the
backfilling legislation and failure to approve Glamis’s proposal
constituted an expropriation and violated the MST. 95 The tribunal
rejected both claims, making this a rare Community Conflict Case to
go against the investor on liability.
The tribunal denied the expropriation claim on the ground that the
actions by state and federal authorities had not deprived Glamis of its
mining rights or even rendered the project unprofitable. In the
tribunal’s view, Glamis could still carry out the project profitably; it
would simply have to engage in additional mitigations that would make
the project less profitable. 96
On the MST claim, the tribunal accepted that the investor’s
reasonable expectations could be relevant in determining whether or
not a violation occurred. The tribunal contended, however, that the
investor’s expectations would be relevant only if the host state had
created those expectations through conduct designed to induce the
investment—as where it offered a specific assurance or commitment to
the investor. 97 The tribunal observed that U.S. authorities had made
no representations to Glamis about the way in which the relevant legal
standard would be interpreted or encouraged Glamis to persist with its
efforts. 98 Moreover, the tribunal asserted that if Glamis believed that
BLM’s interpretation of the UUD standard was incorrect, the proper
venue for its challenge was domestic court—not treaty arbitration. 99 As
for the state backfilling legislation, the tribunal found that it did not
violate any reasonable expectations because mining in California was
a highly regulated activity, and state authorities had offered no specific
assurance that they would not adopt further regulations. 100

92. Id. ¶ 175.
93. Id. ¶ 341.
94. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Ca.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11,
32 I.L.M. 605, 639–49 [hereinafter NAFTA].
95. Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award ¶ 11.
96. Id. ¶¶ 534–36.
97. Id. ¶¶ 621–22, 627.
98. Id. ¶ 767.
99. Id. ¶ 762.
100. Id. ¶¶ 767, 799–807.
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3.

Abengoa v. United Mexican States
As in Tecmed, the claimants in this case were Spanish companies that
sought to build a hazardous waste facility in Mexico—this time near the
municipality of Zimapán. The investors enjoyed initial governmental
support for their project from all levels of government. 101 Once again,
however, the investors seem to have ignored clear warning signs about
the social viability of the project.
Although the award does not mention it, other sources indicate that
there were several communities in close proximity to the proposed
hazardous waste plant. These reportedly included multiple villages of
indigenous Otomi people, 102 one of which was only 500 meters from
the site.103 It has been alleged that these communities were not consulted
about the plant, and that when they learned of it—after its construction
was already underway—they were alarmed.104 Community members were
concerned in particular that the hazardous waste would leach into the soil
and contaminate local water sources, that toxic clouds could be carried to
them on air currents, and that the plant could be vulnerable to
earthquakes in light of a nearby geological fault.105
It is not clear to what extent governmental authorities took these
potential dangers into account when vetting the project; the award
does not mention any specific community concerns or even the
existence of indigenous villages in the area. In fact, the award says
nothing about the impact assessment process, other than to explain
that specialists hired by the investors’ subsidiary, SDS, “carried out
technical studies of the location” and submitted the results to a federal
101. Id. ¶¶ 166–78.
102. See Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Spanish Firms Launch ICSID Dispute Against Mexico
over Stalled Toxic Waste Disposal Project, INV. TREATY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2010),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2010/01/12/spanish-firms-launch-icsid-dispute-againstmexico-over-stalled-toxic-waste-disposal-project
[https://perma.cc/U8ZG-468E]
(asserting that there were “24 Ñañhus indigenous communities and 20 fresh water
springs within a 5 km radius of the waste facility”). The Ñähñu or hñähñu are a subset
of the Otomi people. See About Us, OTOMI NATION http://otomi.org/about [https://
perma.cc/K8TG-ESUS].
103. Ana Lilia Pérez, Abengoa: El Millonario Juicio Contra México, CONTRALINEA (Mex.)
(Mar. 8, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.contralinea.com.mx/archivo-revista/2011/
03/08/abengoa-el-millonario-juicio-contra-mexico [https://perma.cc/UN4B-6KR7].
104. Id.
105. See Katia Fach Gómez, ICSID Claim by Spanish Companies Against Mexico over the
Center for the Integral Management of Industrial Resources, 8 SPAIN ARB. REV. 1, 7 (June 28,
2010) (referring to local indigenous communities near the plant and summarizing
community concerns); Pérez, supra note 103 (same).
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agency in Mexico,106 which promptly issued an Environmental Impact
Authorization.107 There is also no indication that SDS engaged with local
communities to educate them about the project before settling on the
site. The award notes that SDS made presentations to unspecified local
residents, but not until after construction was already underway.108
When local citizens finally learned about the plant, an opposition
movement quickly developed. 109 Concerned citizens established a
protest camp in front of Zimapán City Hall, blockaded local roads, and
organized other large demonstrations in Zimapán and Mexico City,
some of which turned violent. 110 Seeking to diffuse the conflict, federal
authorities proposed that an independent body conduct a study to
evaluate the project’s environmental soundness, and that SDS suspend
work in the meantime—which protest leaders endorsed. 111 Yet SDS
continued building the plant and no independent study materialized,
so protests continued. 112
Federal authorities eventually sent troops to remove protestors so
that the plant could be completed.113 These authorities also sought to
assuage community concerns by stating publicly that the plant complied
with applicable regulations and did not threaten the environment or the
local population.114 The municipality eventually issued an operating
permit for the plant, which soon began receiving hazardous waste.115
The opposition movement continued, and local residents voted
leaders of the movement onto the city council. 116 The new councilors
again called for an independent impact assessment, but still no such

106. Abengoa, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/09/2, Award, ¶ 180 (Apr. 18, 2013) (author’s translation).
107. Id. ¶ 182.
108. See id. ¶ 192 (noting that Abengoa’s subsidiary SDS began to construct the
plant in December 1996); ¶ 193 (explaining that in January 1997 SDS “began to make
presentations on the Plant in various meetings, and to disseminate information
brochures to the population of Zimapán” (author’s translation)).
109. See id. ¶ 194 (explaining that in January 1997 “a civil association called Unidos
por Zimapán (UPZ) was created in Zimapán, which started a campaign against the
plant through brochures, meetings and emails” (author’s translation)).
110. Id. ¶¶ 201–02, 205, 207, 212, 230.
111. Id. ¶ 204.
112. Id. ¶ 601.
113. Id. ¶¶ 237, 239–40.
114. Id. ¶¶ 203, 251.
115. Id. ¶¶ 218–19, 243–46.
116. Id. ¶ 262.
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study occurred. 117 The council initiated an administrative proceeding
against SDS and ultimately found that there had been irregularities in
the EIA and other aspects of the approval process and that SDS had
violated environmental regulations while operating the plant. The
council revoked the plant’s operating permit on those grounds. 118
The investors initiated arbitration under the 2006 Spain-Mexico
BIT, 119 and the tribunal found that Mexico had committed both an
expropriation 120 and a denial of FET. 121 The tribunal rested its
conclusion for both claims on the notion of legitimate expectations. 122
Specifically, the tribunal reasoned that the investors acquired a legitimate
expectation that they would be able to operate the plant indefinitely
because governmental authorities had authorized the project, and the
federal government “confirmed on repeated occasions its support for the
project and its belief that the Plant was being built and operated in a
perfectly regular manner.” 123 The tribunal dismissed the environmental
concerns raised about the plant, asserting that protest leaders had
manufactured those concerns to get themselves voted into municipal
office.124 The tribunal suggested that if these leaders’ concerns had been
genuine, they would have conducted an independent impact assessment
after they took office.125 Nowhere did the tribunal explain how the
municipality could have paid for such a study or why SDS did not offer
to pay for it given the study’s potential to assuage community concerns.
In fact, the tribunal did not acknowledge SDS’s failure to fund the
proposed independent study even when addressing Mexico’s
argument that the investors were negligent in handling community
relations and therefore bore at least partial responsibility for their own
losses.126 The tribunal rejected that argument out of hand. According to
the arbitrators, the conflict had been inevitable given the bad faith of

117. Id. ¶¶ 249, 251, 270.
118. Id. ¶¶ 279–81.
119. Id. ¶¶ 563–71; Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Spain-Mex., Oct. 10, 2006 [hereinafter 2006 Spain-Mexico BIT].
120. Abengoa, S.A., ARB(AF)/09/2 ¶ 624.
121. Id. ¶¶ 637, 644.
122. Id. ¶¶ 614–16 (expropriation claim); id. ¶¶ 645–52 (FET claim).
123. Id. ¶ 616 (author’s translation).
124. Id. ¶ 650.
125. Id. ¶ 619.
126. Id. ¶¶ 660–68.
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protest leaders, and Mexico was in no position to fault SDS’s community
relations efforts when Mexican law did not require SDS to do more.127
Another issue the tribunal does not seem to have considered is whether
the hazardous waste plant was compatible with Mexico’s international
human rights and environmental obligations. This omission is
conspicuous because while the plant was being constructed, local Otomi
communities reportedly asserted that the government’s approval of the
plant without consulting them violated their international human
rights.128 This contention is one that should be taken seriously because
Mexico is a party to multiple binding international agreements that
recognize a right on the part of indigenous peoples, like the Otomi, to
prior consultation under some circumstances. In particular, an
instrument known as ILO Convention No. 169 provides that
governments must consult indigenous peoples whenever contemplating
administrative measures—like the permitting of a hazardous waste
plant—that may affect them directly. 129 In addition, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has interpreted the American
Convention on Human Rights 130 as requiring not only that the state
engage in prior consultations with affected indigenous peoples, but
that in some contexts it refrain from approving a development project
if the affected peoples do not give their free, prior, and informed
consent (FPIC). 131 It appears, however, that the tribunal did not
127. Id.
128. See Press Release, Todos Somos Zimapán, Civil Movement Todos Somos Zimapán
(June 26, 2008), http://todossomoszimapan.blogspot.com [https://perma.cc/9SFAJMGC] (asserting on behalf of the indigenous communities adjoining the hazardous
waste plant that they had a right to prior consultation under ILO Convention No. 169
and demanding that their rights be taken into account).
129. International Labour Organization, Convention No. 169 Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 6, June 27, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1382 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169]. For Mexico’s status as a party to
this Convention, see International Labour Organization, Ratifications of C169—
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), https://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314
[https://perma.cc/UT68-3KUP].
130. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673. For Mexico’s status as a party to this Convention, see InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, Basic Documents—Ratification of the
Convention, https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm
[https://perma.cc/SL9M-GBDZ] [hereinafter American Convention Ratifications].
131. See S.J. Rombouts, The Evolution of Indigenous Peoples’ Consultation Rights Under
the ILO and U.N. Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 169, 217 (2017) (explaining that the
IACHR has repeatedly interpreted the American Convention to provide that “in cases
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consider it necessary to inquire into whether Mexican authorities
complied with these international obligations when authorizing the
plant, or whether those authorities would have committed further
violations by allowing the plant to continue operating.
4.

Clayton v. Canada
The claimants in this case were a U.S. company, Bilcon, and its
owners, the Clayton family, who sought to build an aggregate quarry
and marine terminal in Digby Neck, Nova Scotia. 132 The investors
contended that they were enticed to pursue this project by
promotional material issued by Nova Scotia touting the province’s
potential for mining and quarries, 133 and by expressions of enthusiasm
by provincial officials when they first raised the possibility of carrying
out a project in Digby Neck. 134 However, it was undisputed that
provincial and federal authorities made clear to the investors early on that
any approval would be subject to the outcome of an EIA.135
When the claimants applied for approval, these authorities decided to
carry out a comprehensive form of impact assessment known as Joint
Review Panel or JRP.136 The authorities charged the JRP—an independent
committee of experts—with determining the environmental effects of the
project and measures that might mitigate any significant adverse
environmental effects.137 Consistent with applicable law, the agreement
establishing the JRP defined “environmental effects” to include not only
changes in the physical environment, but also any change that such an
effect may have on health and socio-economic conditions; physical and
cultural heritage; the current use of lands and resources for traditional
purposes by aboriginal persons; or items of historical, archaeological,
paleontological, or architectural significance.138
The investors contended that they spent millions of dollars
conducting studies and engaging with the JRP during the ensuing EIA
of large scale projects that have a major impact on the community, it is mandatory for
the state to obtain consent from the affected communities”).
132. Clayton v. Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 5,
9 (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2015).
133. Id. ¶¶ 457–61.
134. Id. ¶¶ 462–66.
135. Id. ¶¶ 152–57.
136. Id. ¶¶ 15, 157.
137. Joint Review Panel, Environmental Assessment of the Whites Point Quarry and
Marine Terminal Project 109–12, 114–15 (2007) [hereinafter Whites Point EA].
138. Id. at 109.
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process. 139 It is striking, however, that the investors do not appear to
have made any effort to gauge community attitudes before submitting
their proposal and triggering this expensive process. Moreover, even
after the process began, it appears that the investors did little to educate
the community about the proposal and address its concerns—being
described by many residents as “dismissive” of their concerns.140
Yet the concerns were substantial. Community members feared the
impacts of blasting and marine traffic on whales, salmon, and other aquatic
wildlife—all of which were a draw for the area’s burgeoning tourism
industry.141 Some worried that the quarry’s operations would draw too
much water from the local river, adversely affecting fish populations, and
that blasting would harm the quality of drinking water.142 Moreover, Digby
Neck was a rural area with no existing industrial operations, and many
residents anticipated that establishing such a facility would change the area’s
character, deter tourists from visiting, and set Digby Neck on a trajectory
toward increasing industrialization.143 In addition, the area and its
surrounding waters had long been used by aboriginal groups for traditional
purposes, and it was unclear how the project would affect those uses.144
These concerns resulted in a flood of letters to provincial and federal
authorities urging the rejection of the proposal and similar impassioned
entreaties by participants in public hearings.145 The project also had its
supporters,146 but the JRP perceived the weight of public opinion as
substantially against the project.147
Ultimately the JRP determined that the project would likely cause
significant adverse environmental effects that could not be justified and
recommended that the proposal be rejected.148 The JRP based this
conclusion on a number of factors, including its perception that the
economic benefits from the project would be relatively modest while the
burdens would be significant.149 In the JRP’s view, such burdens would
139. Clayton, 2009-04 ¶¶ 18, 470.
140. Whites Point EA, supra note 137, at 71 (“[C]ommunity members described a
dismissive, if not openly hostile, response to their concerns from the Proponent.”).
141. Clayton, 2009-04 ¶ 130.
142. Whites Point EA, supra note 137, at 39.
143. Clayton, 2009-04 ¶ 130; Whites Point EA, supra note 137, at 14, 39, 54–55, 72.
144. Whites Point EA, supra note 137, at 67.
145. Clayton, 2009-04 ¶ 162; Whites Point EA, supra note 137, at 70–72.
146. Clayton, 2009-04 ¶ 217.
147. Id. ¶¶ 218–19; Whites Point EA, supra note 137, at 70–72.
148. Clayton, 2009-04 ¶ 188.
149. Whites Point EA, supra note 137, at 13.
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include adverse effects on the physical environment, including “threats to . . .
marine mammals, fish, birds and rare plant species,” and the “possible
alteration or destruction of a coastal wetland (fen).”150 The JRP also
identified social burdens that could result, including “reduction of
groundwater quantity, altered air quality, and lower property values.” 151
The JRP went on to assert that “the most striking burden” would be an
adverse effect on “community core values,” which it defined to include
a commitment of the Digby Neck community to “a living connection
with traditional lifestyles, harmony with the environment, combined
with a strong sense of stewardship as a way of life.” 152 According to the
JRP, the project would introduce a significant and irreversible change to
Digby Neck, which would affect the community’s core values. 153 The JRP
added that these changes would be so substantial as to constitute “a
Significant Adverse Environmental Effect that cannot be mitigated.” 154
Provincial and federal authorities thereafter adopted the JRP’s
recommendation and rejected the proposal. 155
The claimants initiated arbitration against Canada under NAFTA,
contending that the denial of their proposal violated the treaty’s MST
and anti-discrimination provisions. 156 A majority of the tribunal ruled
in the claimants’ favor, although one arbitrator, Professor Donald
McRae, dissented.
On the MST claim, the majority rested its finding of breach on the notion
of reasonable expectations.157 The majority credited the claimants’
assertion that they reasonably expected the impact assessment to have a
“scientific and technical focus,”158 limited to determining the project’s
“environmental soundness,”159 whereas the JRP focused on whether the
project was consistent with the community’s core values. 160 This, the
majority asserted, effectively gave the community a veto over the

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 14.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Clayton v. Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 37
(Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2015).
156. Id. ¶¶ 11, 40–41.
157. Id. ¶ 455.
158. Id. ¶ 201 (referring to “the expected scientific and technical focus of an EIS”).
159. Id. ¶ 447 (“They expected . . . that their project would be assessed on the
merits of its environmental soundness . . . .”).
160. Id. ¶¶ 451–52, 503.
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proposal. 161 In addition, the majority asserted that the JRP failed to
consider mitigation measures that could have addressed the adverse
environmental effects. 162
The majority also held that Canadian authorities discriminated
against the claimants by subjecting their proposal to more rigorous
scrutiny than they applied to other proposed projects. 163 The majority
deemed these other projects comparable to the claimants’ even
though they had not generated significant community opposition. 164
In his dissent, Professor McRae disputed that the JRP had applied a
standard that was manifestly inconsistent with applicable law. 165 He
noted that the JRP had grounded its comments about adverse effects
on community core values in impacts that were plainly proper for the
JRP to consider, including socio-economic impacts such as those on air
and water quality, fishing, and quality of life. 166 He also noted that the
JRP justified its decision not to recommend mitigation measures on its
perception that the effects of the project could not be mitigated. 167
Moreover, Professor McRae faulted the claimants for deficient
community engagement, suggesting that if they “had been
successful . . . in assuaging the concerns of the community and the JRP
about the socioeconomic impact of the Project on the community,
perhaps in modifying its proposal, perhaps in providing greater
economic benefits, the recommendation might have been
different.” 168 Finally, he observed that if there were any errors in the
standard employed in the review process, the claimants could have
challenged the decision before Canadian courts. 169
5.

Bear Creek Mining v. Republic of Peru
The claimant in this case was Bear Creek, a Canadian company that
sought to develop a silver mine in the Puno region of Peru near the border

161. Id. ¶¶ 23, 523.
162. Id. ¶ 583.
163. Id. ¶¶ 685–731.
164. Id. ¶ 704.
165. Clayton v. Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald
McRae, ¶¶ 2, 15–29 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw4213.pdf [https://perma.cc/YRQ3-RE95].
166. Id. ¶¶ 15–16, 19–25.
167. Id. ¶ 50.
168. Id. ¶ 27.
169. Id. ¶ 42.
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with Bolivia.170 As in other Community Conflict Cases, Bear Creek secured
initial support for the project from governmental authorities, but its plans
were ultimately doomed by a lack of support from local communities.
When Bear Creek first discovered silver, it faced two major threshold
obstacles. First, the site was located within the Aymara-Lupaca Reserve
Area, which the state had declared off-limits to mining to protect its
biodiversity and cultural heritage. 171 The area featured rare flora and
fauna and was home to numerous Aymara indigenous communities,
who followed a traditional lifestyle centered on subsistence agriculture
and herding. 172 Second, Peruvian law provided that a foreign company
could not acquire mining rights near the border without a declaration
of “public necessity.” 173 Bear Creek overcame both of these obstacles
when it convinced the state to “resize” the Reserve Area to exclude the
mining site 174 and to issue the required decree of public necessity. 175
The state had a financial incentive to take both actions because it stood
to derive substantial royalties and tax revenues from the project. 176
Thereafter, Bear Creek undertook exploratory work at the site with
authorization from Peruvian authorities. 177 Encouraged by the results,
Bear Creek sought to develop the mine for production. 178 To do so,
170. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Award, ¶¶ 1–2, 123 (Nov. 30, 2017).
171. Brief for Non-Disputing Party Written Submission of DHUMA & Dr. Carlos Lopez at
3–4, Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21 (May 9, 2016),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7517.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ATL2-R9VE] [hereinafter NDP Submission].
172. NDP Submission, supra note 171, at 3 (describing Aymara communities around
the Santa Ana Project); see also Expert Report of Antonio Alfonso Peña Jumpa ¶¶ 9–
14, Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21 (Oct.
6, 2015) [hereinafter Peña Expert Report].
173. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶ 124.
174. NDP Submission, supra note 171, at 3–4 (discussing the resizing); see also Bear
Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶ 132.
175. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶ 149.
176. AUSENCO VECTOR ET AL., FEASIBILITY STUDY: SANTA ANA PROJECT, BEAR CREEK
MINING CORP. 150 (Oct. 21, 2010) (summarizing anticipated taxes and royalties
payable to Peruvian authorities in connection with the Santa Ana Project).
177. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Witness Statement of Felipe A. Ramírez Delpino, ¶ 15 (Oct. 6, 2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4472.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QS4N-BZRT]; Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru,
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Claimant’s Memorial on the Merits, ¶ 44 (May 29, 2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4458.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YV2-ZPGJ].
178. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21, Claimant’s Memorial on the Merits ¶¶ 45–48.
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however, Bear Creek would have to enter into land-use agreements
with the communities and families who owned or occupied the land
where the project would occur 179 and would also need further
governmental authorizations. 180
Before Bear Creek could secure those authorizations, Peruvian law
required it to conduct an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
(ESIA) and submit the same to Peruvian authorities for review and
approval. 181 Bear Creek did so, but the government identified a number
of deficiencies in the ESIA and did not approve it. 182 In addition,
Peruvian law required mining developers to engage in consultations
with all communities likely to be affected. 183 In fact, special consultation
rules applied in this instance because the affected communities were
indigenous. In such cases, developers had to engage in consultations
with a view toward entering into agreements with the affected
communities, which should confer a share of benefits and provide for
the protection of their cultural heritage. 184 Peru had adopted these
requirements to implement ILO Convention No. 169. 185
Bear Creek would later contend that Peruvian law merely required
it to consult with the relevant communities; it did not actually have to
secure their consent. 186 Peru disputed this, asserting that community
consent was a de facto requirement for any project, 187 but that a legal
179. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶ 259 (explaining that a mining company
“must reach agreements with all land owners and possessors on the mine sites”).
180. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21, Witness Statement of Felipe A. Ramírez
Delpino ¶¶ 16, 29.
181. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
182. Id. ¶¶ 5, 16–17, 25–26, 29; Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶ 167.
183. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21, Witness Statement of Felipe A. Ramírez
Delpino ¶¶ 16, 21.
184. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶¶ 239, 259 (summarizing consultation
obligations and noting that requirements for indigenous communities are set forth in
Supreme Decree 028); Aprueban el Reglamento de Participación Ciudadana en el
Subsector Minero, Decreto Supremeo No. 028-2008-EM, art. 4, https://www.
senace.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NAS-4-6-05-DS-028-2008-EM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GFV6-64SP] [hereinafter Supreme Decree 028] (“[I]n case of projects or
activities to be developed within the lands of indigenous populations . . . the citizen participation
procedure is preferably oriented to establish agreements with their representatives, in order to
safeguard their traditional rights and customs, and establish the benefits and compensatory
measures that correspond to them . . . .” (author’s translation)).
185. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶ 239.
186. Id. ¶ 241.
187. Id. ¶ 258 (“[T]he State must ensure that companies obtain free and informed
consent from the affected communities. . . . [A] company can only proceed with the
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requirement existed in this case by virtue of ILO Convention No. 169 because
the project would affect indigenous communities.188 Curiously, Peru failed to
make another argument as to why these communities’ consent was required:
the fact that Peru, like Mexico, is a party to the American Convention.189 As
noted previously, the IACHR has interpreted the American Convention as
requiring FPIC when a development project would have a serious adverse
effect on an indigenous community’s lands, resources, or way of life.190
That this may have been such a project was attested to by an amicus brief
submitted by a Peruvian NGO and human rights attorney (the “Amici”).191
According to the Amici, local Aymara communities had a spiritual bond with
their territory and believed that the earth and local mountains—which they
considered deities—would be harmed by the mine.192 Some were alarmed
that the mine would draw excessive water from local sources upon which
they, their livestock, and rare wildlife depended.193 Some also feared that
those water sources would be contaminated by hazardous chemicals.194
In any event, Bear Creek did engage in some community
consultations, but Peru and Amici characterized the company’s efforts
as grossly inadequate. Bear Creek allegedly excluded key stakeholders,
choosing to focus only on communities closest to the mine. 195 Bear
Creek also allegedly made highly technical presentations in Spanish,
although most locals were Aymara speakers and could not understand
the accompanying (poor) translation. 196 Some community members
also criticized Bear Creek for not taking their concerns seriously. 197
Bear Creek managed to secure support from some stakeholders after
offering them economic benefits in the form of jobs and payments for

consent of the communities.”); id. ¶ 263 (“[W]hen a community or important
stakeholders decides that it does not accept a mining project on their land, it cannot
be imposed against the will of the people.”).
188. Id. ¶ 258 (summarizing Peru’s argument that, under ILO Convention No. 169,
“the State must ensure that companies obtain free and informed consent from the affected
communities, [and] the company must do what is necessary to achieve that result”).
189. See American Convention Ratifications, supra note 130.
190. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
191. NDP Submission, supra note 171, at 2.
192. Id. at 7–8.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Award, ¶ 261 (Nov. 30, 2017).
196. Id. ¶ 225; NDP Submission, supra note 171, at 6–7.
197. See NDP Submission, supra note 171, at 17.
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land use. 198 Yet the company offered few or no such benefits to others
within the project’s area of impact. 199 Moreover, even some to whom
Bear Creek did offer benefits declined to support the mine 200—
including landowners who would need to sign land-use agreements for
the project to proceed. 201
In time, a broad-based opposition movement developed against the
mine. 202 The movement began with peaceful protests but escalated
into strikes, roadblocks, and violent confrontations, which “paralyzed
all the southern area of Puno.” 203
According to Bear Creek, Peruvian officials assured the company
during this time that its mining rights would be respected and that
there were “no legal grounds to rescind legally granted concessions.” 204
Nevertheless, Peruvian authorities eventually decided that the only way
to diffuse the crisis was to meet protesters’ demands. 205 These included
revocation of the declaration of public necessity and Bear Creek’s
associated mining rights and a moratorium on further mining in the
area. 206 The state accordingly took these actions. 207
Bear Creek challenged the state’s decision before a Peruvian court,
which eventually ruled that it had been unlawful for the state to

198. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶ 407.
199. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Partial Dissenting Opinion of Philippe Sands QC, ¶ 21 (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10107.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7QW-HJDQ] (detailing unrebutted expert testimony that Bear Creek
offered no benefits to several communities that were within the project’s area of impact).
200. Id. ¶ 22 (“[E]ven amongst those communities that had been given jobs ‘there
was a lot of opposition’.”).
201. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶ 263 (“[Claimant was] required to reach
agreements with 5 communities who owned the land and the 94 families who were in
possession of it—if any of these 99 agreements were to fail (and Claimant had obtained
0 by the date [when its Project was canceled]), it would be fatal to the Project.”).
202. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Witness Statement of Felipe A. Ramírez Delpino, ¶¶ 24, 26, 31 (Oct. 6, 2015).
203. NDP Submission, supra note 171, at 8–11; Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic
of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 169–74, 178–79, 182, 188 (Nov. 30,
2017); Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Witness Statement of César Zegarra, ¶ 14 (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw4468.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXK2-8HC9].
204. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶¶ 176, 185.
205. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21, Witness Statement of César Zegarra at ¶¶ 13–25.
206. Id. ¶¶ 13, 22, 25.
207. Id. ¶ 25.
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completely revoke the company’s rights. 208 Nevertheless, Bear Creek
abandoned domestic proceedings when Peru appealed that ruling, 209
in order to pursue arbitration against Peru under the Canada-Peru
FTA before the treaty’s limitation period expired. 210
Bear Creek contended in the ensuing treaty arbitration that the
revocation of its mining rights constituted an expropriation and
violated the MST. 211 The tribunal ruled in Bear Creek’s favor on
expropriation, reasoning that Peru gave Bear Creek the “distinct,
reasonable expectation” that it would be able to develop the mine by
issuing the declaration of public necessity and authorizing the initial
exploratory activity. 212 The tribunal declined to reach the MST claim
because it would not provide any further relief. 213
Peru argued that Bear Creek’s recovery should be precluded or
reduced because ILO Convention No. 169 required community consent
for the mine, and the company’s outreach efforts had been deficient. 214
The majority rejected these arguments. It asserted that the human rights
of indigenous communities were beside the point because “ILO
Convention 169 imposes direct obligations only on States.”215 In addition,
the majority echoed the tribunal in Abengoa in finding that it would be
inappropriate to fault Bear Creek’s engagement efforts because Peru had
not required Bear Creek to take any specific further steps. 216
One member of the tribunal, Philippe Sands, dissented in part. He
asserted that a company like Bear Creek should be mindful of the
human rights of communities in places where it invests, even if not
directly bound by the relevant human rights instruments. 217 He also
208. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 at ¶¶ 211, 213.
209. Id. ¶ 215.
210. The decree revoking Bear Creek’s mining rights was issued in June 2011. Id.
¶ 202. The Canada-Peru FTA requires treaty claims to be filed within thirty-nine
months from when the alleged treaty breach occurred. Canada-Peru FTA, supra note
27, art. 823(1)(c). Bear Creek commenced the arbitration in August 2014—just within the
limitations period. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶¶ 1, 9. The treaty also requires a
waiver of the right to continue domestic proceedings with respect to the measure being
challenged, once arbitration is sought. Canada-Peru FTA, supra note 27, art. 823(1)(e).
211. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 at ¶¶ 341, 499.
212. Id. ¶ 376.
213. Id. ¶ 533.
214. Id. ¶¶ 560–64.
215. Id. ¶ 664.
216. Id. ¶ 412.
217. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/21, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Philippe Sands QC, ¶¶ 10–12 (Nov. 30, 2017).
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concluded that Bear Creek made inadequate efforts to consult with
communities and share benefits with them, as contemplated by ILO
Convention No. 169. 218 He would therefore have held that Bear Creek
bore partial responsibility for the conflict and reduced its damages by
half. 219 Nevertheless, he agreed that the revocation of Bear Creek’s
mining rights constituted an expropriation. 220 According to Professor
Sands, a more appropriate course would have been to suspend the
mining rights rather than revoke them outright, leaving room for
further consultations. 221
II. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS
AND IDENTIFYING WHAT IS REASONABLE TO EXPECT FROM INVESTORS
As Section I.B showed, claimants in Community Conflict Cases typically
contend that they invested in reliance on “reasonable” or “legitimate”
expectations that they derived either from host state assurances or
authorizations or from a regulatory framework that they perceived as
favorable to them.222 As examined below, however, investors’ expectations
in this regard may not always be objectively reasonable, and for reasons
that tribunals do not always consider. Moreover, there may be other
relevant factors apart from investor expectations—including investor
misconduct or steps the investor needed to take to ripen any potential
treaty claim—which could defeat the claim on the merits or warrant a
reduction in damages.223
The sections that follow propose five guidelines to be employed by
tribunals in Community Conflict Cases, each of which is designed to assist
in determining whether asserted expectations were reasonable or identifying
failings of the investor that may be relevant to liability or quantum.

218. Id. ¶¶ 19–22, 25–36.
219. Id. ¶¶ 38–39.
220. Id. ¶ 2.
221. Id.
222. Supra Section I.B.
223. See, e.g., Dani & Akhtar-Khavari, supra note 25, at 41, 67 (arguing that under
the clean hands doctrine, tribunals should take investors’ conduct into account and
that serious misconduct should “bar an investor with unclean hands from benefiting
from the protection mechanism of investment treaties”); George K. Foster, Striking a
Balance Between Investor Protections and National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 201, 204–06 (2011) (noting
decisions in which tribunals have rejected claims when claimants have not adequately
pursued local remedies).
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A. Giving Effect to Aspects of Domestic Law that Limit Investor Expectations
In all of the cases discussed in Section I.B, the claimants contended
that they reasonably expected host state authorities to approve their
project or, if already approved, allow them to carry it out indefinitely.
And in all of those cases but Glamis, the tribunal agreed. Yet arguments
of this nature may not be tenable if the approvals on which the asserted
expectations were based were not certain to be granted or were subject
to potential revocation under domestic law.
It is true that investment treaties establish independent standards
and thus a host state may breach a treaty even if its actions were
justified under domestic law. 224 Nevertheless, domestic law may be
relevant to determining whether or not a treaty breach occurred. 225
Domestic law is relevant in particular to ascertaining the nature and
scope of the investor’s property rights and any requirements or
restrictions on the investor’s activities that it should reasonably have
anticipated. 226 Notably, for large-scale projects like those typically at
issue in Community Conflict Cases, any required approval will often
depend on an EIA and stakeholder consultation, so the investor may
never secure the property rights it seeks or the permission needed to
exercise them if the results of these processes are not favorable.227
Moreover, any approval may be subject to revocation if actual impacts
exceed those anticipated or represented by the investor, or if the investor
violates the law while operating the project. Aspects of domestic law like
these may thus deserve significant attention in Community Conflicts
Cases, although—as will be seen—they do not always receive it.

224. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Works of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 36 [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles] (“The characterization of an act of a State
as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not
affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.”).
225. See id. at 38 (“Especially in the fields of injury to aliens and their property and
of human rights, the content and application of internal law will often be relevant to
the question of international responsibility.”).
226. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES § 8.65 (2007) (“The property rights that are the subject of
protection under the international law of expropriation are created by the host State law.”);
ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 95 (2009) (explaining that “IIAs and general international law
do not . . . regulate the complex problems of proprietary and contractual rights” and “leave
these issues to be decided, in principle, by the law of the host state”).
227. See infra Section II.A.1.
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1. Governmental approvals are often contingent on impact assessment or
stakeholder consultation, the outcomes of which may be inherently uncertain
In recent decades, more than 100 countries have adopted binding
legal requirements for governmental authorities to conduct an EIA
prior to approving any projects or other activities that may have a
significant environmental impact. 228 The required assessment is
generally not limited to impacts on the physical environment; social
and cultural impacts must be examined as well, at least if they flow from
effects on the physical environment. 229 For example, as previously
noted, the Canadian law at issue in Clayton called for governmental
decision makers to consider potential changes to local health and
socio-economic conditions, physical and cultural heritage, the current
use of lands and resources for traditional purposes by aboriginal persons,
or items of historical, archaeological, paleontological, or architectural
significance.230 Federal law in the United States likewise calls for agencies
to consider a broad range of social and cultural impacts.231
Many EIA regimes also contemplate some form of public
participation. 232 This enables local communities to assist in identifying
effects they are likely to experience and express their views about the

228. See NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 23–33 (2008) (describing the
proliferation and content of EIA regimes around the world).
229. See 5 DAVID J. MUCHOW & WILLIAM A. MOGEL, ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS
§ 120.02 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender, 2019) (“[I]f an EIS is prepared and economic
or social effects are ‘interrelated’ with natural and physical effects, the EIS must discuss
‘all of these effects on the human environment.’” (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14
(2019)); Sari Graben, Resourceful Impacts: Harm and Valuation of the Sacred, 64 U.
TORONTO L.J. 64, 95 (2014) (“Cultural impacts form part of environmental assessment
across the country [in Canada] and are increasingly used around the world.”);
Lawrence Susskind et al., The Future of Hydropower in Chile, 32 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 425, 456–57 (2014) (discussing EIA regimes in the United States,
Europe, and Chile and requirements to assess social impacts).
230. See Whites Point EA, supra note 137, at 109 (defining “environmental effects”
for the purposes of the project’s EIA).
231. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2018) (defining the effects to be evaluated in an impact
assessment under U.S. federal law as including “aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic,
social, or health, whether direct, indirect, or cumulative”); see also San Juan Citizens
All. v. Norton, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1280–81 (D.N.M. 2008) (summarizing the cultural
resource impact assessment required by the National Historic Preservation Act).
232. See CRAIK, supra note 228, at 31–32 (stating that almost all EIA systems include
some form of public participation, and describing it as the “soul” of the EIA process).
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proposal.233 For example, when U.S. federal agencies are preparing an
environmental impact statement (EIS), they are required to notify interested
parties about the proposal, make a draft EIS available for public comment,
hold public hearings, and consider and respond to comments received.234 In
addition, when a project is likely to affect a Native American tribe, agencies
must engage in meaningful consultations with the tribe.235 Similar
requirements for public participation exist under Canadian law, which
explains the outpouring of local opposition noted by the JRP in Clayton.236
While EIA regimes merely prescribe procedures that authorities
must follow rather than impose any substantive outcome, the results of
the EIA process will often influence the project’s prospects for
approval. 237 When governmental agencies reject proposals to carry out
a project, they will often explicitly base the decision on public
opposition or on anticipated adverse impacts on local communities or
on the physical environment. 238
233. See, e.g., Chung-Lin Chen, Institutional Roles of Political Processes, Expert Governance,
and Judicial Review in Environmental Impact Assessment: A Theoretical Framework and a Case Study
of Taiwan, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 41, 71 (2014) (explaining that public participation in
Taiwan’s EIA regime has assisted in “identifying problems, distributing information, and
building coalitions against many controversial developmental projects”).
234. See CRAIK, supra note 228, at 31–32 (detailing public participation requirements
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)).
235. See George K. Foster, Community Participation in Development, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 31, 72 (2018) (summarizing consultation requirements under federal law).
236. See generally DWIGHT G. NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES 113–14 (2014) (explaining the nature of consultations with aboriginal
communities required by Canadian law); Shaun Fluker, The Right to Public Participation
in Resources and Environmental Decision-Making in Alberta, 52 ALTA. L. REV. 567 (2015)
(summarizing opportunities for public participation under the 1992 and 2012 versions
of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and under Alberta law).
237. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
(explaining that in the United States “NEPA [the National Environmental Policy Act] itself
does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process,” and yet
“these procedures are almost certain to affect the agency’s substantive decision”).
238. See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 236, at 105 (“[E]xperience over the years with the
[duty to consult aboriginal communities] does show that it can lead to major
modifications to projects or even cancellations of projects that would have
unacceptably severe impacts on Aboriginal communities.”); Letter from Joseph R.
Balash, Assistant Sec’y, Land & Minerals Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to HansChristian Schulze, Country Manager, Eolus N. Am., Inc. (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://basinandrangewatch.org/Crescent%20Peak%20Wind%20Nov%2019%2020
18-Interior.pdf [https://perma.cc/56MR-DXFB] (explaining reasons for denial of
application to construct a wind farm, which included potential adverse impacts on
wildlife and associated hunting and fishing opportunities, obstruction of scenic vistas, and
opposition from local communities and Native American tribes); Millennium Bulk Terminals

2019]

INVESTOR-COMMUNITY CONFLICTS

139

Indeed, in some cases the results of the impact assessment may legally
preclude the government from approving the project. For example, the
regulatory framework applicable to the project at issue in Glamis
prohibited BLM from approving a plan of operations if it would result
in UUD. 239 This standard has been interpreted to preclude BLM from
approving projects that would violate state or federal laws, 240 would
cause impacts not reasonably incident to the proposed activity, 241 or
would cause excessive environmental degradation. 242 Hence, if the
impact assessment revealed that the project would cause effects within
one of these categories, BLM could not validly approve it. 243
If decisionmakers may deny an approval based on the outcome of an
impact assessment or stakeholder consultations, then before these
processes play out the investor should be aware that its ambitions may
not be realized, and thus it may not have an actionable “expectation.” 244
Hypothetically, the host state could guarantee to the investor that it will
either issue the necessary approval or compensate the investor for any
expenses incurred in connection with these processes. In such an event,
the investor may well have a viable claim of reasonable expectations: a

Longview,
WASH.
ST.
DEP’T
ECOLOGY,
https://ecology.wa.gov/RegulationsPermits/SEPA/Environmental-review/SEPA-at-Ecology/Millennium
[https://perma.cc/4PCZ-J57K] (linking the denial of a water quality permit required to
build a coal terminal to adverse impacts to the local environment and communities).
239. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 54–55 (June 8, 2009).
240. See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2019) (defining UUD to include “conditions, activities,
or practices that . . . [f]ail to comply with . . . [f]ederal and state laws related to
environmental protection and protection of cultural resources”).
241. See id. (defining UUD to include “conditions, activities, or practices that . . .
[a]re not ‘reasonably incident’ to prospecting, mining, or processing operations”).
242. See Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2003)
(deciding that BLM has “the authority—and indeed the obligation—to disapprove of
an otherwise permissible mining operation because the operation, though necessary
for mining, would unduly harm or degrade the public land”).
243. See Gregory M. Adams, Bringing Green Power to the Public Lands: The Bureau of
Land Management’s Authority and Discretion to Regulate Wind-Energy Developments, 21 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 445, 469 (2006) (“[T]he UUD standard actually requires prevention
of the degradation. Thus, the UUD standard has the potential to either prevent a
substantial number of development proposals or require approval to be conditioned
on significant mitigation measures.”).
244. See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, ¶¶ 65–
71 (Nov. 13, 2000), (finding that the host state did not violate the treaty by applying
its EIA regime to the claimant’s proposal and rejecting it thereafter because “[t]here
can be no doubt that [the] project required an EIA and that [the investor was] aware
that this was so,” and the EIA was carried out in compliance with domestic law).
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possibility recognized by the tribunal in Glamis. 245 Yet no such
guarantees were alleged in Bear Creek or Clayton and still the tribunals
found that the claimants made their investments in reliance on
reasonable expectations acquired before impact assessment and
stakeholder consultations.
As will be recalled, in Bear Creek, the tribunal asserted that the
Peruvian government gave Bear Creek the reasonable expectation that
it would be able to develop the mine for production by issuing the
decree of public necessity and authorizing initial exploratory activity. 246
In reaching this conclusion, the tribunal did not explain how Bear
Creek could have had such an expectation even though separate
governmental approvals were required for the production phase, and
any such approvals were subject to both an EIA and mandatory
stakeholder consultations. 247 Accordingly, if Peruvian authorities had
not guaranteed any particular result, it would seem that Bear Creek
should have understood that the outcome was not assured.
In Clayton, the majority held that the claimants reasonably expected
that the environmental review process would have a “scientific and
technical focus” 248 and would be limited to determining the project’s
“environmental soundness” 249 without an emphasis on “community
core values.” 250 The majority failed to recognize, however, that the
statutory framework gave responsible authorities discretion in
evaluating whether or not to approve the project in light of whatever
effects the EIA identified—whether biophysical, social, or cultural in
nature. 251 Moreover, these authorities were required to take into
245. See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 621–22, 627
(June 8, 2009) (holding that even though there can be situations where a “Contracting
Party’s conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations,” this was not such a case);
id. ¶ 767 (finding an absence of specific commitments to induce the investment because,
inter alia, the host state “did not guarantee Claimant approval of its [mining] claims”).
246. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶ 376.
247. Ramírez Witness Statement, supra note 177, ¶¶ 4–5 (explaining the series of
governmental approvals that are required for a mining project under Peruvian law at
various stages, as well as the need for an EIA); id. ¶¶ 16–18 (discussing community
consultation requirements that are part of the EIA process).
248. Clayton, 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability at ¶ 201 (referring to “the
expected scientific and technical focus of an EIS”).
249. Id. ¶ 447 (asserting that the claimants knew that an EIA was required but expected
that their project would be assessed “on the merits of its environmental soundness”).
250. Id. ¶¶ 451–52.
251. Authorities could approve a project only if the EIA showed that it would not
have significant adverse environmental effects or that it would have such effects but
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account input from the public when making the necessary judgment
about whether or not the project’s impacts would be justified. 252
Accordingly, unless the authorities had somehow guaranteed a positive
result—which was not alleged—the claimants should have known that
the outcome was uncertain and that social impacts and stakeholder
attitudes could influence the result.
Any claim of reasonable expectations early on in the review process
may be even more far-fetched if domestic law precludes the approval
of the project absent consent by local stakeholders. For example, in the
Philippines, certain types of projects may not take place on the lands
of an indigenous people unless the people has given its consent. 253
Peru contended in the Bear Creek arbitration that a similar consent
requirement existed for projects affecting indigenous communities in
that country. 254 Oddly, however, the tribunal did not squarely address
this argument. 255 Instead, it focused on whether or not the claimant
did all it needed to do by way of community “outreach”—that is, the
process of seeking community consent. 256 The majority asserted in
particular that the “[c]laimant could take it for granted to have
complied with all legal requirements with regard to its outreach to the
local communities” because Peru had not required the claimants to
take specific further steps in that regard. 257 These comments miss the
mark. If a local consent requirement existed—rather than merely a
authorities determined that the effects would be “justified in the circumstances.” See
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37 § 20(1) (repealed 2012).
The statute defined “environmental effect” to include a variety of social and cultural
impacts. See id. § 2(1); see also Toby Kruger, The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
and Global Climate Change: Rethinking Significance, 47 ALTA. L. REV. 161, 179–80 (2009)
(explaining that the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA 1992)
contemplated a “discretionary decision whereby the decision-maker must balance
competing societal values in order to justify project approval”).
252. See Canadian Environmental Assessment Act § 16(1) (providing that, in
making the necessary judgment, decision makers must take into account “comments
from the public that are received in accordance with this Act and the regulations,”
among other factors).
253. See JANE A. HOFBAUER, SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO SELFDETERMINATION 279 (2016) (discussing FPIC requirements under the IPRA).
254. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Award, ¶ 258 (Nov. 30, 2017).
255. Id.
256. Id. ¶¶ 408, 411–12 (asserting that although the Claimant could have taken
further steps in outreach to local communities, the “Claimant could take it for granted
to have complied with all legal requirements” in regards to community outreach).
257. Id. ¶ 412 (emphasis added).
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requirement to seek consent—and such consent had not been obtained
by the time Bear Creek made its investment, then it is not clear how
Bear Creek could possibly have had a reasonable expectation that it
would be able to develop the mine for production.
Furthermore, if the relevant land or resources are owned by
particular individuals or groups, their consent may be required before
the project can go forward even if there is no consent requirement for
all affected communities. 258 This was another issue raised by Peru in
Bear Creek, and the claimant did not deny that the landowners’ consent
was required and that it had failed to obtain it. 259 For the tribunal to
find that the claimant nevertheless had a reasonable expectation to
carry out the project is curious.
2. Domestic law may contemplate the revocation of rights or authorizations
as a result of unanticipated impacts or legal violations
When a government has approved a project and the investor has
made expenditures in reliance, the investor may well acquire vested rights
under domestic law, such that a subsequent restriction on its activities
would require compensation.260 Yet, under some circumstances, a
governmental authorization may be subject to withdrawal or suspension
without compensation.261 Notably, domestic law may provide for the
revocation or suspension of a permit if the project’s impacts turn out to
be more severe than was originally anticipated or than was represented
by the investor, 262 or if the permit holder violates the terms of the
permit or applicable law while carrying out the project. 263 Indeed, a
258. See, e.g., CARLY A. DOKIS, WHERE THE RIVERS MEET PIPELINES, PARTICIPATORY
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, AND ABORIGINAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE NORTHWEST
TERRITORIES 98 (2015) (explaining that developers may require consent from an
aboriginal group if it owns the relevant resources).
259. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 at ¶ 263 (memorializing Peru’s argument that
Claimant was legally required “to reach agreements with 5 communities who owned the land
and the 94 families who were in possession of it” but reached none of the required agreements).
260. See, e.g., Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1333–36 (11th
Cir. 2004) (discussing the state law doctrines of “vested rights” and “equitable estoppel”).
261. See infra notes 262, 263 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 829 F.3d 710, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(affirming EPA’s revocation of a permit authorizing a mining company to dispose of
waste rock in streams after new data led the EPA to conclude that the project was
resulting in unacceptable adverse environmental effects).
263. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (2012) (providing for an order to cease mining
activity if “any condition or practices exist, or that any permittee is in violation of any
requirement of this chapter or any permit condition required by this chapter,
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permit holder in violation of applicable law may be subject to sanction
even if state authorities had purported to confirm the lawfulness of its
activities. In the United States, for example, the federal government
generally cannot be estopped from enforcing the law—or required to
pay compensation if it does so—even if its agents have previously
represented to the party asserting estoppel that the party was in
compliance with the law. 264 Such estoppel will certainly not lie against
the government if the party knew that its activities were unlawful. 265
Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States 266 provides an example of a measure
that was justified under domestic law and did not require
compensation. The plaintiff, Rith, held coal mining leases. 267 To
secure a mining permit, Rith had to submit an assessment of the
probable hydrologic consequences of mining in the area, supported
by soil test results. 268 This was designed to ensure compliance with the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 269 which seeks
to reduce the risk of acid mine drainage (AMD), a phenomenon that
can result in toxic materials reaching groundwater. 270 Rith presented
results purporting to show that the sampled materials were of low
acidity and that the surrounding soils had buffering capabilities,
suggesting a low risk of AMD. 271 The relevant agency accordingly issued
which . . . creates an imminent danger to the health or safety of the public, or is
causing, or can reasonably be expected to cause significant, imminent environmental
harm”); id. § 1271(a)(4) (authorizing permit revocation for a pattern of violations that
are willful or otherwise unwarranted); Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d
1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the suspension of a mining permit for
violations of federal law did not constitute a taking).
264. See Robertson-Dewar v. Holder, 646 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Courts have
been exceedingly reluctant to grant equitable estoppel against the government.”); see also
Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984) (explaining
the rationale for this reluctance as follows: “When the Government is unable to enforce the
law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the
citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined”).
265. See United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 300 F. Supp. 2d 61, 70–71 (D.D.C. 2004)
(holding that any attempt to assert estoppel against the government would necessarily
fail if the party cannot establish, inter alia, that the government intended to mislead
the party by its conduct and the party was ignorant of the true facts).
266. 247 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
267. Id. at 1358.
268. Id. at 1359.
269. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1201–1328 (2012).
270. See Rith Energy, 247 F.3d at 1358–59.
271. Id.
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Rith a permit. 272 Years later, however, the agency received public
complaints about the mine and conducted its own tests. 273 These
contradicted the results submitted by Rith, so the agency suspended
the permit. 274 When Rith challenged this as a taking, the court held
that Rith had no reasonable expectation to mine under circumstances
that posed a danger to the public and should have known that any
authorization was subject to compliance with SMCRA. 275
The same logic can potentially be applied to treaty claims based on
the revocation of a governmental approval. Namely, an investor should
reasonably expect that it will have to conduct itself in accordance with
domestic law or face the loss of its rights. 276 Indeed, ISDS tribunals have
widely recognized that the good faith, non-discriminatory enforcement
of domestic regulations does not violate international law—at least if
the penalties are proportionate to the offense. 277
A recent arbitral award in Aven v. Costa Rica 278 illustrates how this
reasoning can be applied in a Community Conflict Case. In that case,
a group of investors sought to develop a hotel and residential complex
on the Pacific Coast of Costa Rica. 279 They applied for and obtained
the necessary governmental approvals, including environmental
viability and construction permits, and began developing the property
and marketing it. 280 However, the claimants failed to disclose in their
application the possibility that there were protected wetlands on the
property. 281 After the claimants began construction work, local
272. Id. at 1360.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1364.
276. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 305 (July 8, 2016) (“[I]n order for a State’s action in exercise of
regulatory powers not to constitute indirect expropriation, the action has to comply
with certain conditions. Among those most commonly mentioned are that the action
must be taken bona fide for the purpose of protecting the public welfare, must be nondiscriminatory and proportionate.”); Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, and AWG Grp. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Liability,
¶ 139 (July 30, 2010) (“As numerous cases have pointed out, in evaluating a claim of
expropriation it is important to recognize a State’s legitimate right to regulate and to
exercise its police power in the interests of public welfare and not to confuse measures
of that nature with expropriation.”).
278. Aven v. Republic of Costa Rica, Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award (Sept. 18, 2018).
279. Id. ¶¶ 6, 94.
280. Id. ¶ 6.
281. Id. ¶¶ 551–59.
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residents complained that wetlands were being destroyed and the
government ultimately suspended the permits.282 The tribunal
determined that under Costa Rican law a permit applicant has the burden
to disclose the existence of wetlands to the relevant authorities,283 and that
the claimants’ failure to do so in this instance justified the suspension of
the permits, thereby precluding a finding of treaty breach.284 The tribunal
was unconvinced by the claimants’ assertion that they could reasonably
rely on the government to identify the wetlands or on the fact that the
government had issued the necessary permits.285
By contrast, the tribunals in both Tecmed and Abengoa dismissed out
of hand attempts by state authorities to justify permit withdrawals based
on asserted violations by the claimants of domestic law.286 In both cases,
the relevant authority concluded that the investor’s subsidiary had
violated environmental regulations, which constituted grounds under
Mexican law for the permit to be withdrawn.287 Each tribunal determined
that the relevant authority’s decision was misguided—and constituted a
treaty breach—without even inquiring into what remedies Mexican law
provided for infractions of the nature alleged. In fact, each tribunal
asserted that it was ultimately irrelevant whether the decisions to
withdraw approvals had been proper under Mexican law because the
investor had reasonably relied on federal authorities’ initial inaction as
well as on past assertions by these authorities that the facility did not
pose a threat to public safety or the environment. 288
Such a reliance argument may have some merit if the facilities at issue
were truly in compliance with applicable law, or the investors had no
reason to believe otherwise. But if the investors knew or should have
known that the facilities were violating the law, and that withdrawal of
their permits was available as a remedy for such a violation, then reliance
on prior state assertions may not have been justified. ISDS tribunals
should give states considerable leeway to correct their own errors and use
282. Id. ¶¶ 122–33, 145–48.
283. Id. ¶¶ 542–59
284. Id. ¶ 585
285. Id. ¶¶ 360, 551–59.
286. See Abengoa S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/2,
Award, ¶¶ 256, 281 (Apr. 18, 2013); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 124 (May 29, 2003).
287. See Abengoa S.A., ARB(AF)/09/2 ¶¶ 256, 281; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed,
ARB(AF)/00/2 ¶¶ 95, 98, 123–24.
288. See Abengoa S.A., ARB(AF)/09/2 ¶¶ 612–22; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed,
ARB(AF)/00/2 ¶¶ 124, 149–51.
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their police powers to address violations without facing liability when they do
so.289 One way to extend such leeway is to avoid entertaining claims founded
in notions of reasonable reliance by investors who knew or should have
known that they were violating the law.
B. Showing Deference to Host State Applications of Domestic Law,
Particularly When a Decision Protects Against Potential Threats to the Public
or the Environment
As the preceding discussion revealed, an investor may not have a
credible argument that its reasonable expectations were frustrated by
adverse state action if grounds existed under domestic law for the state
to take the action in question. However, to apply that principle the
tribunal must first accept the state’s conclusion that the measure was
justified under domestic law. The discussion that follows will contend
that tribunals should generally defer to the state in this regard absent
evidence of bad faith or manifest error—particularly when the state
was acting to prevent threats to public safety or the environment.
1. Tribunals should generally defer to state authorities when interpreting
and applying their own law
The proposition that international courts or tribunals should show
deference to host state authorities is widely accepted.290 As the tribunal in
S.D. Meyers291 asserted, a “tribunal does not have an open-ended mandate
to second-guess government decision-making,”292 and therefore, the
tribunal’s “determination must be made in the light of the high measure
of deference that international law generally extends to the right of
domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders.” 293 It
is also often said that tribunals should not purport to act as courts of
289. See Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award,
¶ 103 (Dec. 16, 2002), 18 ICSID Rev. 488 (2003) (“[G]overnments must be free to act
in the broader public interest through protection of the environment. . . . Reasonable
governmental regulation of this type cannot be achieved if any business that is
adversely affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say that customary
international law recognizes this.”).
290. See Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54
VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 555–56 (2014) (“Tribunals have increasingly . . . turned to the idea
of deferential standards of review as a tool for balancing the regulatory authority of
the state against foreign investors’ rights and legitimate expectations under investment
treaties.”).
291. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000).
292. Id. ¶ 261.
293. Id. ¶ 263.
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appeals on matters of domestic law 294 and should instead afford states
a margin of appreciation in interpreting their own law. 295
Tribunals vary in how they characterize the appropriate standard of
review, but some have said that they would require “convincing and
decisive evidence”296 or “clear and compelling evidence”297 that host state
findings were misguided. Others have indicated that they would respect
host state determinations so long as they are plausible, made in good faith,
and not manifestly erroneous.298 Moreover, it is well-settled that states
are entitled to a presumption in proceedings before international
courts or tribunals that they acted in good faith. 299
Deference of this sort toward state authorities can be justified on several
grounds. To begin, state authorities generally have more familiarity with

294. See, e.g., RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. Russ. Fed’n, SCC Arb. V (079/2005), Final
Award, ¶ 446 (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber Com. 2010) (“The Tribunal . . . is
neither an appeal body for the determination of Russian tax law nor claims that it has
expert knowledge of that law.”); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶¶ 129–32 (Apr. 30, 2004) (“[T]he Tribunal . . . is
not a further court of appeal, nor is Chapter 11 of NAFTA a novel form of amparo in
respect of the decisions of the federal courts of NAFTA parties.”).
295. See Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
¶ 527 (Nov. 12, 2010) (deciding not to substitute its own judgment for that of Czech
courts regarding whether or not an arbitral award was contrary to Czech public policy,
and to instead allow it a “margin of appreciation”); Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 94–95 (Sept. 24, 2008)
(asserting that the host state should be accorded a “margin of appreciation” in
applying its own law).
296. See Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility at ¶ 95.
297. See Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 273 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. Mar. 17, 2006).
298. See, e.g., Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd., Final Award, ¶ 527 (indicating that the
tribunal would defer to Czech courts’ interpretation of Czech law so long as their
conclusion was “plausible,” “reasonably tenable, and made in good faith”).
299. See Tacna-Arica Question (Chile v. Peru), 2 R.I.A.A. 921, 930 (1925) (“A
finding of the existence of bad faith should be supported not by disputable inferences
but by clear and convincing evidence which compels a conclusion.”); FRÉDÉRIC G.
SOURGENS ET AL., EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 134 (2018)
(noting the presumption of good faith in ISDS and explaining that it calls for the
tribunal to treat the parties “as honest and reasonable unless there is proof to the
contrary”); Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J.
389, 412 (2002) (“International courts and tribunals have to presume that states act in
good faith. To do otherwise would call the honour of states into question, risk
introducing political and diplomatic factors into the judicial process, impede
international relations, and increase the danger of escalation.”).
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their own law and are in the best position to interpret it.300 State authorities
are also closer to the underlying facts than an international tribunal and may
have greater expertise in any relevant scientific or technical issues.301 In
addition, showing deference is consistent with the dignity due to host states
as sovereigns within their own borders and tends to promote the legitimacy
of the court or tribunal among states and their publics.302
While most tribunals accept the need to show deference in principle,
the extent to which they do so in practice is sometimes dubious. Several
of the tribunals in Community Conflict Cases discussed above in
Section I.B recited some version of the above mantras about deference
but proceeded to reject state determinations rather lightly—at least
when the determinations were adverse to the claimants. For example,
the majority in Clayton endorsed the language in S.D. Meyers, calling for a
“high measure of deference” toward host state authorities when regulating
within their own borders303 and asserted that “mere error in legal or factual
analysis” would not warrant a finding of treaty breach.304 Yet this did not
stop the majority from substituting its own judgment for that of the JRP and
Canadian authorities regarding how to interpret the legal standard for an
EIA under Canadian law. Notably, the majority characterized the JRP’s
interpretation of the standard as a fundamental departure from
Canadian law,305 despite the evidence discussed above in Section II.A.1 that
the interpretation was solidly grounded in the relevant statute.306

300. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 VA. L. REV. 289,
354 (2016) (noting that a foreign sovereign may be “the best possible expert on its own law”).
301. See Schill, supra note 2, at 602 (“Expertise . . . will often militate for respecting
science-based determinations made by domestic agencies . . . . Regularly, arbitral
tribunals will lack the specific knowledge to determine or review the substantive
soundness of such science-based determinations even with the help of experts.”).
302. See id. at 600–01 (explaining that the approach of providing deference has
contributed to the legitimacy achieved by the World Trade Organization’s Appellate
Body and the European Court of Human Rights).
303. Clayton v. Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability,
¶ 440 (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2015).
304. Id. ¶ 594.
305. Id. ¶ 594.
306. See Clayton v. Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of Professor
Donald McRae, ¶¶ 2, 15–29 (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2015).
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2. When deciding which of conflicting host state decisions to credit, tribunals
should be mindful of the values at stake and the host state incentives behind
each decision
When tribunals have rejected findings by host state authorities, they
have sometimes done so in part because those authorities—or other
authorities at a different level of government—had previously taken a
contrary position. As noted previously, the tribunals in Tecmed and
Abengoa based their conclusions in part on the fact that that federal
authorities had previously found that the facilities at issue did not pose
serious environmental or safety threats. 307
These tribunals thus gave priority to certain governmental findings
over others. Namely, they credited those that were favorable to the
investor and rejected those that were adverse: an approach that feeds
into the perception that ISDS is biased in favor of investors. 308 The
tribunals did not explain why they did so, but it is possible they felt that
the statements favorable to the investor were more reliable because
they were against the state’s interest in the arbitration. This reasoning
is not always viable, however. State authorities may have good reasons
for changing their views, for example if new facts or evidence emerge
suggesting that their initial findings were erroneous or incomplete. 309
Further, a different governmental agency may examine the matter and
discover that the reality is contrary to what another agency suggested.
If the investor knew the true state of affairs, it may not be credible to
claim that it was grossly unfair, manifestly arbitrary, or otherwise
internationally wrongful for the state to correct itself.
The tribunal in Abengoa may also have reasoned that findings or
assertions by federal authorities should trump those by municipal
authorities. The truth is, however, that findings by municipal authorities
may be more reliable in some instances because they are closer to the facts
on the ground and may be more in tune with impacts on local
stakeholders or the environment and less influenced by the financial
incentives that can lead higher authorities to overlook impacts.310
307. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
309. See CRAIK, supra note 228, at 42–43 (asserting that EIAs may be unreliable or
fail to comply with applicable legal requirements in part because “developing states often
have few experts trained in EIA techniques and related scientific disciplines, environment
ministries or other institutions responsible for implementing EIA requirements lack
financial resources, and there is often a lack of baseline environmental data”).
310. See Riccardo Pavoni, Environmental Rights, Sustainable Development, and InvestorState Case Law: A Critical Appraisal, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
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Accordingly, tribunals faced with conflicting host state findings should
not automatically credit one finding over the other simply because of
when it was made or which authority made it. In such situations, the
tribunal should undertake its own independent examination of the facts
and law and reach its own conclusions. While some deference to host state
authorities may be warranted, tribunals should modulate the degree of
deference they provide to particular decisions depending on the context in
which each was made and the values or risks at stake in each decision.
The idea that the degree of deference accorded to governmental
measures should vary depending on the context is by no means a novel
one. Courts in many legal systems apply an exacting standard of review
for measures that target fundamental rights or vulnerable groups, but
a deferential one when evaluating measures designed to protect public
health, safety, or the environment (which do not place special burdens
on vulnerable rights or groups). 311 Similar reasoning would suggest
that tribunals in Community Conflict Cases should show considerable
deference when reviewing decisions to withhold, revoke, or suspend a
governmental approval based on perceived environmental or social
threats. Conversely, decisions may warrant little or no deference if
ARBITRATION 525, 553 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (arguing that
decisions by municipal authorities may warrant more deference than those of federal
authorities in light of subsidiarity: the notion that decisions should be made “by the
authorities most representative of (and proximate to) citizens’ needs and concerns”).
311. See Kennecott Greens Creek Mining Co. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 476
F.3d 946, 954–55 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explaining that U.S. courts review agency decisions
on mine safety regulations under a deferential standard that requires only
“reasonableness, not perfection,” and that “an extreme degree of deference” is
appropriate when the agency is “evaluating scientific data within its technical
expertise”); Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 70 F. Supp. 3d 151, 170 (D.D.C. 2014),
aff’d, 829 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (deferring to EPA’s determination as to what
constitutes an unacceptable adverse effect on wildlife: so long as it was “reasonable and
supported by the record, the Court must defer”); Simona Morettini, Community
Principles Affecting the Exercise of Discretionary Power by National Authorities in the Service
Sector, in GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN CONSTRAINTS UPON NATIONAL RIGHT TO REGULATE: THE
SERVICES SECTOR 106, 118 (Stefano Battini & Giulio Vesperini eds., 2008) (noting that
the European Court of Justice shows great deference when reviewing state measures
adopted for public health and safety); Berta E. Hernández-Truyol, Querying Lawrence,
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151, 1168 (2004) (explaining that U.S. courts apply heightened
scrutiny to classifications that disadvantage a suspect class or infringe on fundamental
rights); id. at 1210–11 (describing similar standards of review for measures affecting
vulnerable groups or fundamental rights in other legal systems); Patricia Popelier &
Catherine Van De Heyning, Procedural Rationality: Giving Teeth to the Proportionality
Analysis, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 230 (2013) (“[T]he ECtHR leaves a wide margin of
appreciation in the sphere of environmental protection.”).
AND
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there is a risk that, by adopting it, the state was ignoring or facilitating
such threats or otherwise infringing important rights—such as an
indigenous community’s right to prior consultation or consent. 312
Tribunals should be mindful that host states may have strong incentives
to downplay risks associated with development projects and that these
incentives can continue after a conflict has arisen between the investor
and the local community—or even after the treaty arbitration has been
filed. After all, if governmental authorities previously approved a project
and purported to confirm that it complied with all applicable laws and
regulations, it could be very damaging politically to recognize later that
their prior findings were erroneous. The authorities would effectively be
conceding that they failed in their most fundamental responsibilities and
put the public or the environment at risk. For the tribunal to credit
assertions by state authorities in such a context, without scrutiny, would
be no less of a failure of responsibility—particularly if some other
governmental entity has made a different finding.
To be sure, even when significant deference is due to a governmental
decision, the tribunal must still exercise independence. Were tribunals
too deferential, host states would be free to take whatever action against
foreign investments they desired, so long as they cloaked it in the guise of
environmental protection or public safety.313 Tribunals have arguably
struck the right balance when holding that they will respect a state
determination entitled to deference so long as it was made in good faith
and was not manifestly erroneous.314 It similarly makes sense for tribunals
to insist on clear and convincing evidence for any asserted basis to reject
such a determination—beyond the fact that state authorities at some
point expressed a different view.
C. The Potential Relevance of Local Remedies
Even if the tribunal concludes that a decision by state authorities was
erroneous and contrary to the investor’s reasonable expectations, it
does not automatically follow that a treaty breach has occurred. As I

312. Schill, supra note 2, at 25 (“[R]ights can also militate in favor of deference to host
state conduct, for example, if that conduct has the objective to protect rights and interests of
third parties affected by conduct of foreign investors, above all the host state’s population.”).
313. Arato, supra note 290, at 558 (discussing the risk that deference could be “a means of
giving respondent states a free pass to accomplish indirectly what they cannot do directly,” as
by “engaging in indirect expropriation through dubious environmental measures”).
314. See id. (deference is only useful when states are acting in good faith).
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have argued elsewhere, 315 and as several tribunals have held, 316 if a
mechanism exists under domestic law to have that decision reviewed
and reversed without undue delay or expense, then the host state’s
treatment of the investment has not necessarily frustrated reasonable
expectations or otherwise fallen below international standards.
Investment treaties can be, and increasingly are, drafted to require
the pursuit of local remedies for a specified period of time. 317 Yet even
if there is no such requirement as a procedural matter certain claims
may properly be viewed as defective on the merits absent a reasonable
effort to pursue local remedies. 318 This proposition is most widely
accepted for claims challenging judicial decisions because denial of
justice has traditionally been viewed as having a substantive exhaustion
element. 319 Nevertheless, the same reasoning can apply equally to
claims challenging administrative decisions—such as the denial or
withdrawal of a permit—provided the decision is readily subject to
review and reversal. 320

315. See generally George K. Foster, Striking a Balance Between Investor Protections &
National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 49
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 201 (2011).
316. Id. at 204–09 (collecting cases); see also Cervin Investissements S.A. v. Republic
of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/2, Award, ¶ 504 (Mar. 7, 2017) (“[T]here are
situations where, by failing to exercise the remedies allowed by local law against a
supposedly unlawful action, the investor prevents the international arbitral tribunal
from concluding that the Respondent acted arbitrarily or unfairly, precisely because
[the Respondent] was not put in the position of being able to rectify the error
committed by an administrative act.” (author’s translation)).
317. See Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and
the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 404 (2018) (noting that treaties
can be drafted to “require the use of local remedies for a significant period of time
before international adjudication can be triggered,” and citing as an example India’s
new model BIT, which provides for a five-year period).
318. Foster, supra note 315, at 204–07.
319. See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies
in Investment Arbitration, 4 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 1, 14 (2005) (noting that
a denial of justice by the judiciary “is completed only if the incriminated decision has
been appealed unsuccessfully”).
320. See, e.g., Generation Ukr., Inc. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award,
¶ 20.30 (Sept. 16, 2003) (holding that an expropriation claim based on an
administrative decision was defective on the merits in the absence of an effort to secure
relief from the decision before national authorities); Cervin Investissements S.A., Award,
¶¶ 504–08 (Mar. 7, 2017) (holding that an administrative decision could not be
treated as a treaty breach because the investor could have challenged it in local courts
but failed to do so).
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In some cases, however, it may not be feasible to pursue local
remedies. The prospects for securing redress may be remote, and the
investor may be facing financial pressure that makes delay in the filing
of treaty arbitration impracticable. 321 In addition, some treaties require
the investor to initiate treaty arbitration within a limited period of time
and waive local remedies as a condition for proceeding to arbitration. For
example, in Bear Creek, the investor made an initial effort to pursue local
remedies—and even managed to secure a ruling in its favor from the
court of first instance—but had to abandon that effort while an appeal
was pending in order to commence treaty arbitration within the limitation
period.322 By contrast, in Clayton, the investors made no effort to pursue
local remedies despite the fact that NAFTA gave the investors three years
to pursue local remedies before filing a treaty claim, 323 and Canadian law
provided for judicial review of the challenged decision. 324 The
dissenting arbitrator found that this failure to seek judicial review
rendered the claims fatally defective, 325 but the majority simply ignored
the issue of local remedies.
D. Confirming that the Investor’s Expectations Were Compatible with the
Host State’s Non-Investment International Obligations
Even if the host state frustrated expectations of the investor that were
reasonable from a domestic law perspective, that does not necessarily
mean the investor should prevail on its treaty claims. The tribunal
should also confirm that the investor’s asserted expectations were
reasonable from an international law perspective, particularly in light of
the host state’s human rights and environmental obligations.
It is increasingly recognized that investment treaties should be read
in harmony with the host state’s non-investment international

321. See generally Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)98/3, Award
(June 26, 2003) (explaining that the claimant declined to pursue local remedies because it
was facing an imminent risk of bankruptcy and the prospects for securing relief were
miniscule); Foster, supra note 315, at 216–43 (discussing the case and arguing that the claim
should not have been treated as defective on the merits under the circumstances).
322. See supra Section I.B.5.
323. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M., arts. 1116(2), 1117(2).
324. Clayton v. Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald
McRae, ¶ 42 (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw4213.pdf [https://perma.cc/YRQ3-RE95].
325. Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
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obligations. 326 Support for this idea can be found in Article 31(3)(c)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 327 which
calls for treaties to be interpreted in the light of “relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties,”—
which may include human rights or environmental principles. 328
As discussed in greater detail below, one way tribunals can
harmonize the host state’s investment and non-investment obligations
is to hold that it is not reasonable for the investor to rely on host state
conduct that the investor knows, or should know, is contrary to the
state’s non-investment obligations. Moreover, if the investor purports
to secure rights that are inconsistent with the host state’s international
obligations, the tribunal could treat the act as contrary to international
public policy and dismiss the case on that basis.
1. If commitments offered to an investor inherently conflict with the host
state’s international obligations, the investor cannot reasonably rely on them
Notwithstanding the growing body of jurisprudence and scholarship
calling for human rights and environmental principles to inform the
interpretation of investment treaty standards, tribunals in most Community
Conflict Cases have either made no mention of such obligations or asserted
that they are effectively irrelevant for their purposes. For example, in Bear
Creek, the majority asserted that whatever the content of Peru’s human
rights obligations, those obligations were for Peru to comply with—not the
investor—and the investor could rely on the legal framework established by
Peru and any rights that Peru conferred on the investor.329
Other tribunals have effectively sidestepped arguments about human
rights or environmental obligations by asserting that the host state can avoid
any conflict with these obligations by compensating the investor for any
failure to satisfy commitments previously made to the investor.330 In other

326. See, e.g., Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award,
¶ 1200 (Dec. 8, 2016) (“The BIT has to be construed in harmony with other rules of
international law of which it forms part, including those relating to human rights.”).
327. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter VCLT].
328. Id.; see Urbaser S.A., ARB/07/26 (citing Article 31(3)).
329. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/21, Award, ¶ 664 (Nov. 30, 2017).
330. See, e.g., Ioana Knoll-Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard and
Human Rights Norms, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION 310, 341 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., 2009) (endorsing this approach); Nicolette Butler & Shavana Musa,
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words, if the host state decided that something it had authorized the
investor to do would violate human rights or environmental norms, the
state could disallow the activity but pay the investor compensation. 331
It is not difficult to see the appeal of this approach. After all, it seems
to allow the host state to uphold all of its obligations and relieves
tribunals from having to determine the scope and content of the host
state’s human rights and environmental obligations—subjects with
which many of the business lawyers who sit on ISDS panels are bound
to feel uncomfortable. 332 Moreover, in some cases the reasoning is
perfectly viable. Take, for example, Suez v. Argentina. 333 In that case, the
host state promised the operator of a water utility that it could charge
certain rates or tariffs to users of the system, with the understanding
that the utility may be “directed by the government to provide free or
subsidized services to certain classes of consumers,” in which case
“payment for them was to be made from the National Treasury.” 334
Argentina later refused to allow the investor to charge the agreed
tariffs, asserting that they were too high for certain consumers and
would unduly restrict access to water, thereby infringing the human
right to water. 335 The tribunal pointed out that the state could avoid
any infringement of human rights by subsidizing the services of lowincome consumers as explicitly contemplated in the contract, or
otherwise compensating the investor. 336

Systemizing Human Rights Within Investment Arbitration, 28 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 433, 438–
39 (2017) (collecting cases in which tribunals required compensation for actions taken
to fulfill non-investment obligations).
331. Butler & Musa, supra note 330, at 440; Knoll-Tudor, supra note 330; see also S.
Am. Silver Ltd. (Berm.) v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Award,
¶¶ 560–61, 796, 938 (Nov. 22, 2018) (acknowledging that the human rights of local
indigenous communities gave the host state a valid reason to terminate the investor’s
mining concession, but holding that the host state nevertheless had to pay compensation).
332. Caroline Foster, A New Stratosphere? Investment Treaty Arbitration as
‘Internationalized Public Law’, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 461, 481 (2015) (“Many investment
treaty arbitrators have little experience in public policy or expertise in the fields of
national or international environmental law, [or] human rights . . . .”); Julie A.
Maupin, Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach,
54 VA. J. INT’L L. 367, 394, 413 (2014) (“[T]he majority of investment arbitrators come
from private law or commercial dispute settlement backgrounds[.]”).
333. Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, and AWG Grp. Ltd. v.
Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 34, 38, 50, 235 (July 30, 2010).
334. Id. ¶¶ 84, 106–11.
335. Id. ¶¶ 34, 38, 50, 235.
336. Id. ¶¶ 235, 252, 262.

156

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:105

Nevertheless, in some cases a commitment made to the investor
would inherently violate human rights, and no financial intervention
by the state would avoid or erase the violation. For example, a host state
could not authorize an investor to mine or dispose of hazardous waste
in a manner that would cause serious contamination of local water
supplies without violating its human rights obligations. 337 And no
payment of compensation (whether to the investor or to local citizens)
could eliminate the inherent incompatibility between what the
investor was authorized to do and the state’s international obligations.
Moreover, there are strong policy arguments against requiring a state
to compensate an investor in such situations. First, the host state—
particularly in a developing country—may not have the resources
necessary to compensate the investor, and if the state had to do so it may
be deterred from taking action to protect human rights or the
environment. 338 The state may simply pretend that there is no
pollution taking place and suppress any local opposition that arises.
Second, for an ISDS tribunal to award compensation would be rightly
perceived by many as rewarding the investor for undertaking a project
that was inherently incompatible with human rights and further
undermine the legitimacy of investment treaties and ISDS.
A preferable approach may be to recognize that the investor could not
reasonably have expected to engage in conduct that was contrary to the
host state’s international obligations and therefore reject the claim on the
merits—at least to the extent the claim relied on “reasonable expectations.”
The following hypothetical illustrates the point with particular
starkness. Imagine that the host state promised the investor that it
would exterminate all citizens in the vicinity of a mine or allow the
337. Jason Rudall, The Interplay Between the UN Watercourses Convention and
International Environmental Law in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE NONNAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: A COMMENTARY 436–38
(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al. eds., 2019) (discussing international
environmental agreements and human rights that may be violated if a state allows
pollution of a population’s water supplies); Lauren Manning, Mining for Compromise in
Pastoral Greenland: Promise, Progress, and Problems in International Laws’ Response to
Indigenous People, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 931, 965–66 (2017) (citing sources that “make
it clear that functions associated with extractive mining, like the improper disposal of
toxic waste, exposure to harmful chemicals and radiation, and water pollution, all pose
threats to well-recognized human rights”).
338. Jeff Waincymer, Balancing Property Rights and Human Rights in Expropriation, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 275, 295 (Pierre-Marie
Dupuy, Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2009) (discussing a risk that
in developing countries an obligation to pay compensation could lead to regulatory chill).
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investor’s private security forces to do so, in order to avoid potential
resistance to the investor’s activities. In such a case, there would be an
inherent conflict between what the host state promised and its human
rights obligations, and the investor clearly could not reasonably expect
the host state to follow through on its promise because such an act
would constitute a jus cogens violation. 339 If the investor sought to
recover damages in ISDS for the failure to fulfill this promise, one
would hope the tribunal would have no hesitation finding the promise
unenforceable under international law and award no compensation. 340
Yet there does not appear to be any good reason to limit this
principle to jus cogens norms. If rights conferred by the host state
under domestic law were contrary to any international obligations of
the host state, and the investor knew or should have known that this
was so, then the investor arguably could not reasonably have expected
to enforce those rights. This should come as no surprise to investors
because treaty claims are often premised on the notion that
international law trumps domestic law when the two conflict. 341 Just as
a host state cannot rely on its own law to avoid its international
commitments, 342 so too an investor may not be able to rely on acts of
339. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 257
(2d Cir. 2009) (holding that killings or other inhumane acts as part of a widespread
or systematic attack on a civilian population are a crime against humanity); THOMAS
WEATHERALL, JUS COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL CONTRACT 219 (2015)
(observing that widespread or systematic targeting of civilians is a crime against
humanity and a jus cogens violation).
340. See Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Jus Cogens, Transitional Justice
and Other Trends of the Debate on Odious Debts: A Response to the World Bank Discussion Paper on
Odious Debts, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 59, 68–69 (2009) (“[I]t is increasingly accepted
that compliance with jus cogens norms is an international law obligation that not only binds
states, but also private individuals and corporations.”); Cezary Mik, Jus Cogens in
Contemporary International Law, 33 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 27, 67 (2013) (“No one who acts in
the contemporary world (a state concluding contract, a transnational corporation) and
who is subject to international law should be permitted to violate those few norms which
are considered by the international community as a whole as fundamental.”).
341. See, e.g., Amco v. Republic of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Award, ¶ 40
(May 31, 1990) (“[A]pplicable host state laws . . . must be checked against
international laws, which will prevail in case of conflict.”); HEGE ELISABETH KJOS,
APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (2013) (“When appropriate, arbitral tribunals may in a
supervening, or trumping, fashion apply international rules that conflict with the
otherwise applicable national norms . . . . [N]ational norms are deliberately disapplied
or set aside in favour of international norms.”).
342. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 224, Commentaries to Article 3, § 3
(collecting decisions by international courts and arbitral tribunals affirming this “well

158

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:105

the host state—or rights conferred under the internal law of the host
state—that violate international law.
Moreover, even if there are other theories on which the investor could
prevail apart from “reasonable expectations”—such as if the host state
discriminated against the investor or formally nationalized certain of the
investor’s rights—it may be appropriate to take the human rights or
environmental implications of the project into account when determining
the amount of compensation due.343 For example, if the investor’s mining
rights could not be exercised without the consent of affected indigenous
communities under human rights law, then those mining rights may not be
as valuable as they would be if subject to no such restriction.
To see how the above principles could make a difference in
Community Conflict Cases, consider Abengoa and Bear Creek. In both of
those cases, the claimants contended that they reasonably expected to
be able to operate their projects on or near lands occupied by
indigenous communities, even though those communities had not
given their consent. 344 This was despite the fact that both host states
were both parties to the American Convention, which the IACHR has
interpreted as requiring FPIC when a project could have a serious
adverse effect on an indigenous community’s lands, resources, or way
of life. 345 The awards in Abengoa and Bear Creek do not examine in detail
what impacts the projects at issue could have had on local indigenous
communities. But if the potential impacts rose to the level where FPIC
was required, then it may have been impossible to square the investors’
asserted expectations with the host states’ international obligations,
and it may have affected the value of whatever rights they did hold.
A similar scenario was at issue in South American Silver v. Bolivia, a
recently decided case arising from a mining project that the host state

settled” proposition); VCLT, supra note 327, at 339 (“A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”).
343. See Tomoko Ishikawa, The Role of International Environmental Principles in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Precautionary and Polluter Pays Principles and Partial
Compensation, in NATURAL RESOURCES GRABBING: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
245, 271–72 (Francesca Romanin Jacur, Angelica Bonfanti & Francesco Seatzu eds.,
2016) (arguing that an investment in an environmentally-sensitive area that is likely to
be subject to further regulation should be valued lower than one undertaken
elsewhere, all else equal).
344. See supra Sections I.B.3 & I.B.5.
345. See supra Sections I.B.3 & I.B.5.
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canceled due to opposition by local indigenous communities. 346 In
contrast to Abengoa and Bear Creek, the tribunal found that the investor
could not reasonably expect to carry out the project at issue in light of
the social conflict. 347 Nevertheless, the tribunal upheld the
expropriation claim, concluding that the host state could not revoke
the investor’s mining rights without paying compensation. 348 The
tribunal at no point acknowledged that the host state was a party to the
American Convention 349 or sought to ascertain whether local
communities’ FPIC would have been required for the project to go
forward: factors which could have been treated as relevant to whether
or not the revocation was justified or at least in determining the
amount of compensation.
Another example is presented by the pending case of Infinito Gold v.
Costa Rica. 350 The claimant contends in that case that Costa Rica
authorized it to develop a gold mine in a remote region near the San
Juan River that forms the border with Nicaragua, but revoked the
approval after an outpouring of social opposition. 351 Opponents
asserted that the mine presented serious environmental threats and
would have violated Costa Rica’s international obligations, particularly in
light of a risk that toxic chemicals would contaminate the San Juan River
and harm endangered species.352 While these risks may have been
exaggerated, if the mine truly could not have been operated profitably
346. S. Am. Silver Ltd. (Berm.) v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 201315, Award ¶¶ 121–69 (Nov. 22, 2018) (describing the conflict and revocation of the
mining concession).
347. Id. ¶¶ 652–57.
348. Id. ¶¶ 654, 657, 796, 938.
349. See American Convention Ratifications, supra note 130.
350. Infinito Gold Ltd. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5,
Request for Arbitration (Feb. 6, 2014).
351. Id. ¶¶ 3–7, 56; Martin Mowforth, Las Crucitas Mine, Costa Rica, THE VIOLENCE
OF DEVELOPMENT (2019), https://theviolenceofdevelopment.com/las-crucitas-minecosta-rica [https://perma.cc/NY3P-ZU5F] (describing social opposition to Infinito
Gold’s mine, which manifested in protests and petitions to the Costa Rican courts).
352. DANIEL KORPELA, A SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE
CRUCITAS GOLD MINING PROJECT IN COSTA RICA 27, 53–54 (2014) (discussing arguments
by opponents of the mine that contamination of the San Juan River could violate Costa
Rica’s international obligations and stating, “[i]f [Acid Rock Drainage] is allowed to
occur . . . or it is not managed correctly it can cause a huge burden for Costa Rica,
contamination can spread into Nicaragua, and then this becomes an international issue”);
Mowforth, supra note 351 (“There have also been concerns from Nicaraguan environmental
groups who believe that the chemicals used in the extraction process will pollute the San Juan
River which forms a natural border between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.”).

160

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:105

without causing transboundary harm in violation of international
environmental law,353 then arguably, the investor could not reasonably
have expected to develop the mine and invested at its own risk.
2. Securing rights contrary to international law is potentially against
international public policy
If an investor has purported to secure rights that it knows to be
contrary to the host state’s international obligations, not only should
its claim potentially fail on the merits for a lack of “reasonable
expectations,” but the claim may properly be treated as inadmissible
because the investor violated international public policy.
Several tribunals have dismissed claims after concluding that the
investors had “unclean hands” because they had committed fraud,
corruption, or some other illegality. 354 A number have characterized
the misconduct as a violation of international public policy or ordre public,
which the arbitrators viewed as depriving them of jurisdiction or rendering
the claims inadmissible.355

353. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941)
(asserting that one state cannot use its territory to harm another “when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence”);
see also Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment,
2010 I.C.J. Rep. 18, 68 (Apr. 20) (same); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hung.
v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 41 (Sept. 25) (same); Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 227, 241–42 (Advisory Opinion of July
8) (“[T]he general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national
control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.”).
354. See Dani & Akhtar-Khavari, supra note 25, at 67 (citing authority in support of
the existence of “a general principle of law and a matter of international public order
that [bars] an investor with unclean hands from benefiting from the protection mechanism
of investment treaties”); Andrew Newcombe, Investor Misconduct: Jurisdiction, Admissibility, or
Merits?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW & ARBITRATION, 187, 190, 196 (Chester
Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (summarizing cases).
355. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26,
Award, ¶¶ 238, 248–52 (Aug. 2, 2006) (dismissing the case because the investor
procured its rights through fraud and “[i]t is not possible to recognize the existence
of rights arising from illegal acts, because it would violate the respect for the law
which . . . is a principle of international public policy”); Plama Consortium Ltd. v.
Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award (Aug. 27, 2008), ¶¶ 139–44
(dismissing the claims because the investor’s deceptive acts were contrary to
international public policy and the principle of good faith, and “the substantive
protections of the [treaty] cannot apply to investments that are made contrary to law”);
World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶¶ 179–
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It may not be a stretch to extend the above reasoning to some situations in
which the investor claims to have secured a right to engage in conduct that
would violate the host state’s human rights or environmental obligations.
The act of seeking such rights—potentially while promising a flow of taxes,
royalties, or other economic benefits to the state—may be no less repugnant
to international public policy than bribing a host state official.
E. Holding the Claimant Accountable for Mismanaging Stakeholder
Relations and Other Forms of Contributory Fault
If the tribunal finds, despite applying the foregoing guidelines, that
the host state violated its treaty obligations by canceling the investor’s
project, one further step would still be needed before calculating
damages. Namely, the tribunal should consider whether the investor
contributed to its losses, as by failing to undertake sufficient due diligence
before investing, not engaging adequately with local stakeholders, or
committing misconduct while carrying out the project. In that event, a
reduction in recovery may be appropriate.
1.

The principle of contributory fault
Under international law, as under many domestic legal systems, if a party
has contributed to the losses for which it seeks redress, the award may be
reduced in proportion to the claimant’s contribution.356 This principle is
expressed in Article 39 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“ILC Articles”): “In
determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the contribution to
the injury by wilful or negligent action or omission of the injured State or any
person or entity in relation to whom reparation is sought.”357
Several ISDS tribunals have recognized the principle of contributory
fault and have reduced damages on this basis. Some have faulted the
investor in particular for undertaking an inadequate risk assessment
before investing. 358 Others have reduced from the award any amounts
88 (2006) (dismissing claims on the merits because the claimant secured the contract
through bribery in violation of international public policy).
356. Judith Gill & Rishab Gupta, The Principle of Contributory Fault after Yukos, 9 DISP.
RES. INT’L 93, 93 (2015).
357. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 224, at 109.
358. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/7, Award, ¶¶ 168–78 (May 25, 2004) (faulting the claimant for not
investigating local zoning restrictions before buying real estate and not negotiating
contractual provisions that could have protected it if the property were not rezoned);
id. at 243 (reducing damages by fifty percent).
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expended by the investor that were excessive and imprudent in light
of risks facing the investment. 359 Still others have reduced damages for
misconduct that made the investor vulnerable to adverse host state
action—such as tax evasion schemes 360 or acts taken without a required
governmental authorization 361—even if the tribunal did not view the
misconduct as justifying the measures that the state took in response.
2.

Application of the principle in Community Conflict Cases
Similar reasoning could readily be applied to reduce damages in
Community Conflict Cases in appropriate circumstances, although
several tribunals have declined to do so to date. Notably, the tribunals
in Tecmed and Clayton did not even discuss contributory fault, while the
tribunals in Abengoa, Bear Creek, and South American Silver recognized
the principle but found that no reduction was warranted.
In language subsequently endorsed by the majority in Bear Creek,362 the
tribunal in Abengoa articulated the standard for contributory fault as follows:
For the international responsibility of a State to be excluded or
diminished based on the investor’s omission or fault, it is necessary
not only to prove said omission or fault, but also to establish a causal
nexus between the [omission or fault] and the harm suffered. In
other words, for the argument to succeed, it would be necessary to
have evidence that, if a social communication program had been
carried out from [when the Claimants first invested] in a timely
manner, there would not have been the events that [later] led to the
loss of the Claimants’ investment. 363
359. See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
Award, ¶¶ 426–30 (July 14, 2006); Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of
Tanz., Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, ¶¶ 789–97 (July 24, 2008).
360. See Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA
227, Award, ¶¶ 484–516, 1614 (July 18, 2014) (reducing damages by twenty-five percent
because Yukos’ involvement in “tax optimization schemes” attracted scrutiny from Russian
authorities, even if it did not justify the seizure and forced liquidation of the company).
361. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/11, Award, ¶¶ 679–80, 687 (Oct. 5, 2012) (holding that the a transfer of an
interest in the project to another company violated Ecuadorian law and contributed
to the termination of the investor’s contractual rights, and reducing damages by
twenty-five percent). The dissenting arbitrator would have reduced damages by fifty
percent. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/11, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Brigitte Stern, ¶¶ 7–8 (Sept. 20, 2012).
362. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Award, ¶ 409 (Nov. 30, 2017).
363. Abengoa, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/2,
Award, ¶¶ 670–71 (Apr. 18, 2013) (author’s translation).
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Neither of those two tribunals deemed this standard satisfied on the
facts before it. The tribunal in Abengoa felt that it was inappropriate to
fault the claimants for the quality of their community engagement
given that Mexican law did not impose any specific obligations on the
claimants in that regard. 364 The tribunal added that, in its view, the
community conflict was inevitable due to the “aggressive and deceitful
campaign” waged by the plant’s critics. 365 The majority in Bear Creek
similarly reasoned that even if the investor had been deficient in
community outreach, the state had not required the investor to do
more, and so those failings could not justify a reduction in damages. 366
It is worth considering, however, whether these tribunals’ approach
to contributory fault was unduly restrictive. One point of concern is
that these tribunals seemed to focus exclusively on the quality of the
investor’s “social communication program,” despite the fact that this is
only one of many areas in which investor fault may arise. Even if the
investor was competent in communicating with the community after
making its investment, it may have neglected to conduct adequate due
diligence before investing, including in ascertaining the community’s
attitude toward the proposal and how difficult it would be to secure a
social license. 367 In addition, the investor may have failed to offer the
community a share of benefits that was reasonable under the
circumstances. Alternatively, the investor may have engaged in
misconduct that undermined its relations with local communities or
governmental authorities even if its approach to “communication” was
reasonable. For example, if the investor violated environmental
regulations or terms of its permit—as in Tecmed 368—this may have
fueled criticisms of the project and negated what would otherwise have
been adequate engagement efforts. By the same token, the misconduct
may have invited scrutiny by state authorities, prompting these
authorities to take action that they might not otherwise have taken.

364. Id. ¶¶ 664–68.
365. Id. ¶ 672 (author’s translation).
366. Bear Creek Mining Corp., ARB/14/21 ¶ 412.
367. See Muchlinski, Caveat Investor? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor Under
the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 527, 542 (2006) (“[T]he
investor is bound to assess the extent of the investment risk before entering the
investment . . . . Any losses that subsequently arise out of an inaccurate risk assessment
will be borne by the investor.”).
368. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 123 (May 29, 2003) (acknowledging legal violations).
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The tribunals in Abengoa and Bear Creek did not expressly consider these
potential forms of contributory fault.
Second, the standard articulated by the tribunals in Abengoa and Bear
Creek seems to require a causal connection between the investor’s fault
and the loss of the investment. Yet the investor’s fault may contribute to
losses even if it does not trigger the outright cancelation of the project.
Notably, the investor may have committed more capital than a prudent
investor would have invested after clear warning signs emerged about
the project’s prospects. In the same vein, missteps by the investor in
community relations may have necessitated efforts and expenditures
(by way of damage control) that would otherwise not have been
required. For example, in Copper Mesa Petroleum v. Ecuador, 369 the
tribunal found that the claimant responded inappropriately to
“provocations” by project opponents, including using mace and other
forms of physical force,370 thereby generating ill-will among the local
population and making it more difficult to secure community support. 371
This, the tribunal felt, warranted a thirty percent reduction in damages. 372
By contrast, the tribunals in Abengoa and Bear Creek at no point considered
whether the claimants’ fault may have exacerbated their losses, even if that
fault was not—in the tribunals’ view—what ultimately caused the state to
withdraw the permits.373
Third, the tribunals in Abengoa and Bear Creek focused on whether the
claimants did all they were legally required to do to engage with local
communities. This limitation, too, is artificial. Basic business sense calls
for investors to do whatever they reasonably can to minimize risk
exposure, and the fact that certain steps may not be legally mandated
does not diminish their importance. Professor Sands made a similar
point in his dissent in Bear Creek when advocating for a fifty percent
reduction in damages. 374
Rather than limiting the inquiry to domestic legal requirements,
tribunals may find it instructive to consider how the investor’s conduct
sizes up against relevant international standards, such as the OECD

369. Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 2012-2, Award
(Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2016).
370. Id. ¶ 6.99.
371. Id. ¶ 6.100.
372. Id. ¶ 6.102.
373. See supra Sections I.B.3 & I.B.5.
374. Partial Dissenting Opinion of Philippe Sands QC, ¶¶ 10–12,
25–39 (Nov. 30, 2017).
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Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 375 UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, 376 and international financial institutions’
environmental and social standards. 377 All of these call for companies
to conduct pre-investment due diligence and impact assessment,
follow prescribed steps to monitor and mitigate impacts, and engage
in particular ways with local stakeholders—whether or not required to
do so by domestic law. 378 Some financial institution standards go
further and establish additional safeguards for indigenous peoples,
including an FPIC requirement and an obligation to share economic
benefits with affected communities. 379 Compliance with standards like
these not only promotes respect for human rights and environmental
protection, but also reduces the investor’s own risk. 380 Consequently,
in some cases a failure to take steps contemplated by international
standards could be construed as contributory fault, even if compliance
would have been wholly voluntary.
It may also be instructive to compare the investor’s conduct to that
of other companies who manage to carry out comparable projects
without social conflict. For example, it is increasingly common for project
developers to negotiate agreements with local communities before
375. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/
48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK23-UYA8].
376. UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011),
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.
pdf [https://perma.cc/PY4D-QG5U].
377. See, e.g., INT’L. FIN. CORP., GUIDANCE NOTES: PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY ii (Jan. 1, 2012), https://www.ifc.org/wps
/wcm/connect/9fc3aaef-14c3-4489-acf1-a1c43d7f86ec/GN_English_2012_FullDocument_updated_June-27-2019.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=mKqITOj
[https://perma.cc/4VVX-UJ4F].
378. See Elisa Morgera, Human Rights Dimensions of Corporate Environmental
Accountability, in CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
321, 511–14 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2009) (summarizing these
standards and asserting that they collectively represent an emerging consensus that
private companies need to meet minimum standards in their business operations
beyond domestic legal requirements); see also Foster, supra note 235, at 79–81
(summarizing relevant aspects of these standards).
379. See also Foster, supra note 235, at 79–81 (describing safeguards for indigenous
peoples under International Finance Corporation standards).
380. See Luke Danielson, Allocation of Resources to Communities From Mining and Oil
and Gas Operations, 2C-1 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 5 (2009) (citing numerous examples
of social conflicts that developed when mining and oil companies failed to meet
international standards, resulting in delays or cancelations).
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undertaking large-scale projects that will affect them, in order to minimize
the risk of conflict and maximize prospects for securing governmental
approvals.381 These agreements typically provide for the developer to
mitigate impacts of concern to the community and give the community a
share of economic benefits in exchange for its support for the project. 382
The failure to offer terms to local communities that compare favorably to
those that have helped avoid conflicts in similar contexts could amount to
negligence. Fault may also attach if the investor fails to negotiate such
agreements in good faith—with duly representative community
leadership—in accordance with procedural safeguards that will promote
the agreement’s legitimacy in the community.383
The tribunal in South American Silver also declined to reduce its award
on the basis of contributory fault, but on different reasoning. 384 That
tribunal found that the investor contributed to the social crisis that led
to the cancelation of its project 385 and that Bolivia was within its rights
to revoke the investor’s mining concession, but also determined that

381. Foster, supra note 235, at 85–86.
382. Id.; see also William M. Laurin & JoAnn P. Jamieson, Aligning Energy Development with
the Interests of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, 53 STET. L. REV. 453, 458 (2015) (noting that in
Canada these agreements “typically contain provisions on how the parties will work
together and avoid or mitigate the identified impacts” and provide for “various benefits to
the affected Aboriginal community to offset the impacts,” in exchange for non-opposition).
383. See generally George K. Foster, Combating Bribery of Indigenous Leaders in
International Business, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 59, 68–76 (2015) (describing reports
of alleged bribery of indigenous community representatives during consultations over
development projects); see id. at 97–98, 100–02 (outlining procedural safeguards that
can protect the integrity of negotiations and ensure that any benefits offered to
community leaders are bona fide and not intended to improperly influence their
judgment); GINGER GIBSON & CIARAN O’FAIRCHEALLAIGH, GORDON FOUNDATION, IBA
COMMUNITY TOOLKIT: NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IMPACT AND BENEFIT
AGREEMENTS 178 (2015), http://gordonfoundation.ca/app/uploads/2017/03/IBA
_toolkit_web_Sept_2015_low_res_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BYV4-YMZE]
(discussing
problematic tactics that developers sometimes use during the negotiation of an agreement
with an indigenous community, including negotiating with people who lack legitimate
authority within the community or otherwise exploiting plural systems for decision-making).
384. Id. ¶¶ 874–75 (acknowledging Bolivia’s argument that any award should be
reduced to reflect the claimant’s contributory negligence but declining to do so).
385. S. Am. Silver Ltd. (Berm.) v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 201315, Award ¶¶ 490, 505 (Nov. 22, 2018) (summarizing the investor’s “serious
shortcomings in its relationship with the community,” which “contributed to increase
the divisions among the Indigenous Communities, the radicalization of the opposition
groups and the practical impossibility of seeking the consensus that its advisors warned
would be necessary in order to operate in the region”).
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Bolivia breached the treaty by failing to offer compensation. 386 The
tribunal rejected Bolivia’s argument that the award should be reduced
for contributory fault, reasoning that the failure to offer compensation
was an act of Bolivia that was in no way attributable to the investor. 387
This conclusion is perplexing, because for purposes of contributory
fault the issue is not whether the host state’s treaty breach was
attributable to the investor, but whether—assuming a breach by the host
state has been established—the investor’s fault contributed materially
to its damages. 388 Hence, if the investor negligently failed to take steps
that could have minimized conflict with local communities and
prevented the resulting revocation of its concession or at least reduced
its expenses, arguably the investor should not have recovered as much
as it would have if it had been blameless. It is not clear why it would be
necessary to show that the investor somehow caused Bolivia’s refusal to
pay compensation before a reduction in the award could occur.
III. THE PROPOSED GUIDELINES LEAVE AMPLE ROOM FOR STATE
LIABILITY AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES
Having examined in Part II a series of guidelines that could preclude
or reduce recoveries in Community Conflict Cases, it is worth
considering how much room would be left for host states to incur
liability and whether or not this would be consistent with the goals
investment treaties are designed to achieve. As explained below, there
are a multitude of scenarios in which such liability could result, and the
outcomes contemplated by the guidelines would be fully consistent with
the rationales underlying investment treaties.

386. Id. at ¶¶ 546–66 (determining that the expropriation was within Bolivia’s
sovereign powers as recognized by the relevant treaty); id. at ¶ 875 (asserting that
although the expropriation itself was permissible, “the violation of the Treaty arose
from Bolivia’s failure to compensate or offer to provide compensation”).
387. Id.
388. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 224, Commentary to Article 39, § 1 (“Article
39 deals with the situation where damage has been caused by an internationally
wrongful act of a State, which is accordingly responsible for the damage in accordance with
articles 1 and 28, but where the injured State, or the individual victim of the breach, has
materially contributed to the damage by some wilful or negligent act or omission.”).
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A. Scenarios that May Properly Give Rise to State Liability in Community
Conflict Cases
Investment treaties vary in the investor protections they articulate,
and some include exception provisions or carve-outs that could defeat
claims that would otherwise be viable. 389 Nevertheless, it is possible to
identify a multitude of scenarios in which host states could incur
liability under investment treaties in Community Conflict Cases
without running afoul of the guidelines set forth in Part II—subject to
a potential reduction in damages for contributory fault in appropriate
cases. The examples provided below are intended to be illustrative
rather than exhaustive.
One way a host state could be found liable would be if it made a
specific commitment to the investor and failed to comply with the
same—assuming the commitment was consistent with the state’s noninvestment international obligations. For example, the host state
might promise the investor that if it did not issue a required approval
it would compensate the investor for any expenses incurred during the
review process. Reneging on such a commitment could violate a variety
of treaty provisions, 390 and so long as the investor did not seek to
induce a violation of the state’s international obligations, nothing
should preclude the commitment’s enforcement.
Liability could also arise if the host state revoked an approval
previously granted to the investor based on purported risks to public
safety or the environment, when no such risks actually existed or were
greatly exaggerated. As noted above in Section II.B.1, the tribunal
should generally defer to host state determinations on matters of
domestic law, but it need not do so if the host state’s findings were
manifestly erroneous or made in bad faith. An example of evidence
that might tend to show the state’s bad faith in such a situation would
be if the host state promptly began operating the project in its own
right under similar conditions or allowed another company to do so. 391
389. See generally Korzun, supra note 2 (summarizing drafting innovations contained
in some treaties that restrict the scope of treaty standards and the wide variety of
exception provisions and carve-outs that treaties may contain).
390. See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 621–22,
627 (June 8, 2009) (asserting that violation of a specific assurance or commitment to
an investor could violate the MST); JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 215 (2011) (explaining that violation
of a specific assurance could violate FET or a treaty’s umbrella clause).
391. Tribunals have found states liable for treaty breaches under such
circumstances. See, e.g., Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Boliviarian Republic of Venez., ICSID
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Indeed, host state liability might attach even if the project did pose
genuine environmental or social threats, but the threats were
attributable to actions of the host state or a third party rather than to
the investor. Notably, state authorities might be tempted in some cases
to blame the investor for their own failings or those of state-owned
enterprises which put local communities at risk unnecessarily. 392
Similarly, the state might blame the investor for a failure to deliver
promised benefits to a community that the state itself or community
leaders misappropriated through no fault of the investor. 393
Another scenario in which the investor might prevail would be if the
host state revoked the investor’s rights when there was still a reasonable
chance that the investor could demonstrate that the project could be
undertaken without undue risks or otherwise secure community
support. For example, in Bear Creek, Professor Sands faulted Peru for
revoking the investor’s mining rights rather than suspending them and

Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶ 961 (Apr. 4, 2016) (state terminated investor’s
rights in a mining project based on potential impacts on the environment and
indigenous communities, but tribunal viewed these as a pretext for the state’s plan to
nationalize the project); Khan Resources v. Gov’t of Mong., Permanent Court of
Arbitration, Case No. 2011-09, Award ¶ 117 (Mar. 2, 2015) (discussing how the state
terminated investor’s rights in a uranium extraction project based on certain alleged
legal violations and potential impacts on a special protected area, but thereafter
allowed similar operations by a different company).
392. See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award,
¶ 376 (July 14, 2006) (finding an FET violation based on a state entity’s failure to meet
its contractual commitment to remediate water treatment facilities, which resulted in
water quality problems that officials attempted to blame on the investor).
393. In some countries the state establishes or mandates a fund into which an
investor must pay specific amounts for the benefit of local communities, but monies
are sometimes misappropriated by state officials or local leaders and the promised
benefits never materialize. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OECD POLICY TOOLS, CORRUPTION IN THE EXTRACTIVE VALUE
CHAIN: TYPOLOGY OF RISKS, MITIGATION MEASURES AND INCENTIVES 109 (2016)
[hereinafter OECD POLICY TOOLS] (describing the phenomenon of state-mandated
local development funds, which may be prone to “elite capture, embezzlement,
misappropriation and misuse of funds for purposes other than those governing the
fund”); Kendra E. Dupuy, Corruption and Elite Capture of Mining Community Development
Funds in Ghana and Sierra Leone, in CORRUPTION, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
DEVELOPMENT: FROM RESOURCE CURSE TO POLITICAL ECOLOGY 69, 69–72 (Aled Williams
& Philippe Le Billon eds., 2017) (explaining how elite capture and rent-seeking
behavior by local leaders can prevent developers’ contributions to community
development funds or trusts from accomplishing their intended purposes).
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allowing further impact assessment and community consultation after
a cooling off period. 394
A few other host state liability scenarios warrant mention. In
particular, the host state might incur liability if it applied its laws to the
claimant’s project more strictly than it did to a comparable project
operated by host state nationals or third-country nationals; 395 if it
subjected the investor to a serious lack of due process or a denial of
justice when the investor sought to challenge a denial or revocation of
an approval in a domestic forum; 396 or if local citizens who opposed
the investor’s activities used physical force against the investment and
the state was not sufficiently diligent in providing police protection. 397
B. The Proposed Interpretive Framework Encourages Investment Flows and
Good Governance
As the foregoing examples show, there would still be substantial
room for a host state to be found liable in a Community Conflict Case
under the proposed guidelines. As examined below, there would have
to be such room in order for the guidelines to be consistent with
investment treaties’ object and purpose. At the same time, there must
be significant limits to host state liability, and I would submit that the
proposed guidelines strike an appropriate balance.
As a starting point for this discussion, it should be noted that VCLT
Article 31 provides for considering the treaty’s object and purpose as a
primary means for interpreting its meaning. 398 Tribunals typically seek
394. Partial Dissenting Opinion of Philippe Sands QC, ¶ 2 (Nov.
30, 2017).
395. See, e.g., Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1,
Award, ¶ 181 (Dec. 16, 2000), 7 ICSID Rep. 341 (2005) (holding that Mexico violated
NAFTA’s national treatment provision by enforcing a tax law more aggressively against
a U.S. investor than it did against similarly-situated Mexican-owned companies); JORGE
E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 90
(2012) (discussing the possibility that “the uneven enforcement of environmental
standards on different foreign and/or domestic investors would fall foul of the MFN
or national treatment clauses contained in an investment treaty”).
396. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 33, at 178–82 (discussing potential liability for denial
of justice or other failure to provide adequate access to justice or fair procedure).
397. Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1,
2–4 (2010) (summarizing case law involving claims based on violence against the investment
by private parties under the full protection and security standard found in many treaties).
398. VCLT, supra note 327, at 340 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.” (emphasis added)).
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to ascertain the treaty’s goals in this regard from the language of the
treaty itself, and especially from its preamble. 399
Countries may enter into investment treaties for any number of
reasons, but treaties’ preambles typically announce as a key goal the
promotion of investment flows between the signatories. 400 Essentially,
the hope is that the treaty will encourage companies from one country
to invest in the territory of the other because the ISDS mechanism
could allow them to recover damages if the host state were to treat
them in a manner that was internationally wrongful. 401
Another rationale often articulated for these treaties is that they
promote good governance. 402 The idea is that host states will be
encouraged to follow the rule of law, make known in advance the rules
that the investor is expected to follow, provide investors with due
process, and refrain from discrimination, lest they incur liability. 403 At
the same time, investment treaties are not intended to abrogate the
basic responsibility of the host state to regulate in the public interest,
and good governance means more than acting predictably toward
foreign investors. It also means, inter alia, being responsive to those
most directly affected by governmental actions and otherwise
protecting the public and the environment. 404
399. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 226, at 113–14 (“Many tribunals have
sought to interpret IIAs on the basis of their object and purpose, typically by looking
at their titles and preambles.”).
400. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND
INTERPRETATION 3 (2010) (“In their preambles, BITs profess that they seek to promote
economic prosperity through facilitating foreign investment flows.”).
401. Jeswald Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 77 (2005) (“The
basic assumptions behind BITs are that a bilateral treaty with clear and enforceable rules
to protect and facilitate foreign investment reduces risks that the investor would otherwise face
and that such reductions in risks, all things being equal, encourage investment.”).
402. VANDEVELDE, supra note 400, at 2–3 (“BITs essentially require that investment
be treated in a way that is consistent with the rule of law. Promoting the rule of law
with respect to foreign investment may be regarded as the primary function of a BIT.”).
403. Thomas W. Wälde, Improving the Mechanisms for Treaty Negotiation and Investment
Disputes: Competition and Choice as the Path to Quality and Legitimacy, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008-2009 505, 574 (Karl P. Sauvant ed.,
2009) (explaining that investment treaties create government transparency and
accountability, which supports the rule of law, as well as long-term development).
404. See U.N. DEP’T. OF ECON. & SOCIAL AFFS., WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY
2014/2015: LEARNING FROM NATIONAL POLICIES SUPPORTING MDG IMPLEMENTATION 142–43
(2016), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_archive/2015wess
_full_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG7F-MYKY] (defining good governance to include
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The guidelines proposed herein are fully consistent with the twin
goals of promoting investment flows and encouraging good
governance. They do so by ensuring that investors are protected
against conduct that is arbitrary, discriminatory, in bad faith, or
expropriatory—as well as ensuring access to a functioning system of
justice and reasonable police protection—while still giving the state
wide space to protect its population and the environment.
Some might contend that the guidelines would screen out too many
cases or result in anemic recoveries, thereby deterring investors from
undertaking large-scale projects that may attract controversy. The truth is,
however, that investors could readily protect themselves by employing
common-sense safeguards. If they did so, they would not need to rely on
investment treaties except for the most serious forms of maladministration.
To begin, the investor could undertake pre-investment due
diligence. Among other things, the investor should seek to ascertain
applicable requirements under domestic law and the scope of the host
state’s human rights and environmental obligations, including
whether or not community consent would be required for the project.
The investor could also engage early on with both governmental and
community representatives to ascertain their receptivity to the
proposal. At this stage, the investor could seek to negotiate contractual
terms with the host state providing for the investor to receive
compensation for its expenditures during the review process if, at the
end of the day, the project did not go forward for no fault of the
investor. If the investor decided to proceed, it could carry out a
rigorous impact assessment consistent with international standards. It
could also consult with affected communities to educate them about
the proposal more thoroughly, address any concerns they may have,
and offer them a share of benefits commensurate with the impacts they
will experience. If successful at achieving community buy-in, the
investor could sign contracts with those communities and ensure that
they are faithfully implemented. Alternatively, if the state has
established other means for delivering benefits to local communities,
the investor should seek to ensure, before moving forward, that these
arrangements are satisfactory to community stakeholders and likely to

not only “the rule of law, effective institutions, transparency and accountability,” but
also “respect for human rights, and the participation of all citizens in the decisions
that affect their lives,” and having leadership that is “responsive to the needs and
aspirations of its citizens”).

2019]

INVESTOR-COMMUNITY CONFLICTS

173

deliver the promised benefits. 405 If and when the state approved the
project, the investor could scrupulously comply with domestic laws and
regulations, as well as with any agreements it may have signed, and give
the state no reason to act against it. If the investor did all or even much
of this it would keep its risk exposure within manageable bounds.
What the investor could not do is ignore local communities and engage
exclusively with governmental authorities when seeking to operate a
hazardous waste facility, mine, or other high-impact project. Nor could
the investor presume itself entitled to carry out such a project so long as
it goes through the motions of impact assessment and stakeholder
consultation. Equally untenable would be the assumption that, so long as
it convinces a state authority to sign off on its plans, the project’s safety
and environmental soundness—and the investor’s own diligence—may
never subsequently be questioned.
CONCLUSION
The discussion above has shown that Community Conflict Cases decided
on the merits to date have largely fed into the prevailing narrative that
investment treaties and ISDS are biased in favor of investors, unduly restrain
states in the exercise of their regulatory prerogatives, and conflict with host
state sovereignty. It has also argued, however, that a few adjustments to the
analytical framework employed in these cases could strike a better balance
between investor rights, human rights, and environmental protection.
Under the guidelines proposed herein, host states would be encouraged
to behave honestly and justly toward investors because they could face
significant potential liability if they did not. Companies could rest assured
when investing that they would have an avenue for redress should they
experience serious mistreatment at the hands of the host state—at least so
long as their own hands were clean when they sought it. For just as states
would be encouraged to meet an international minimum standard, so too
405. For example, the state may prescribe certain amounts that the investor must
contribute to local communities and even establish a fund to be used for that purpose.
See OECD POLICY TOOLS, supra note 393, at 109 (2016) (explaining that it is common
for the state to mandate that extractive companies pay into local development funds,
which “may be state-managed, firm-managed, or state-established and communitymanaged”); Dupuy, supra note 393, at 71 (describing the phenomenon whereby states
“require mining companies to directly pay affected communities, for instance . . . by
paying directly into state-established but community-managed funds”). If it is clear that
the amounts to be contributed are not sufficient to achieve community buy-in, or that
the funds are prone to mismanagement or corruption, the investor should take this
into account in deciding how and whether or not to proceed.
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would investors. Investors would be incentivized to conduct due diligence
and commonsense risk management whenever embarking on a large-scale
venture among a vulnerable population. They would have every reason to
respect the human rights of local stakeholders in the places where they
operated. It would be incumbent upon them to protect the
environment to the extent feasible, and to refrain at all costs from any
activities that could cause transboundary harm, threaten endangered
species, or otherwise violate the host state’s international
environmental obligations. And investors would be well-advised to
respect host state laws and avoid corruption. In short, investors would
need to hold themselves to the same standards of fairness and equity
to which they might one day seek to hold the state.

